

in the  
**Supreme Court**  
of the  
**United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

CASE NO. **75-969**

S. D. COHN & COMPANY and SIDNEY D. COHN,  
*Petitioners,*  
*vs.*

SHIRLEY WOOLF and ROBERT MILBERG, and  
FIBERGLASS RESOURCES CORPORATION  
*Respondents.*

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
IN AND FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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Supreme Court, U. S.  
**FILED**

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## A.

**OPINIONS BELOW**

The petitioners, S. D. COHN & COMPANY and SIDNEY D. COHN, seek a writ of certiorari to review the judgments and decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the case of SHIRLEY WOOLF and ROBERT MILBERG, Plaintiffs, Appellants, vs. S. D. COHN & COMPANY & SIDNEY D. COHN, Defendants, Appellees [case nos. 73-4044; and 74-2449] 5 Cir. 1975, 515 F.2d 591; rehearing denied, 521 F.2d 225. The decision of the Fifth Circuit vacated a judgment and order of the United States District Court, In and For The Southern District of Florida, in favor of the defendants, appellees, S. D. Cohn & Company and Sidney D. Cohn, and remanded the cause for further proceedings.

Copies of the following decisions, opinions and judgments are appended hereto:

Appendix A — Order-Decision of Fifth Circuit, Dated October 15, 1975, denying petition for rehearing (A. 1-7). 521 F.2d 225.

Appendix B-1 — Judgments of the United States Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit, dated July 3, 1975, vacating judgment and order of trial court (A. 8-9).

Appendix C — Opinion of United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, dated July 3, 1975 (A. 10-53).

- A. Appendix to this Petition.  
R. Reference to pages of trial transcript in record below.

Appendix D — Order of United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, denying motion of plaintiffs for relief from judgment (A. 54).

Appendix E — Order of United States District Court In And For Southern District of Florida, dated October 3, 1973, denying motion of plaintiffs for rehearing, and to amend findings of facts and conclusions of law (A. 55).

Appendix F — Final Judgment Of United States District Court In and For Southern District of Florida bearing date September 14, 1973 (A. 56).

Appendix G — Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Of United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, dated May 22, 1973 (A. 57-68).

## B.

**GROUND UPON WHICH JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT IS INVOKED**

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit herein bears date July 3, 1975. The petition for rehearing was denied on October 15, 1975. The original opinion of the Fifth Circuit bears date July 3, 1975 (Appendices A-C). Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C., §1254; and 28 U.S.C., § 2101(c); and Supreme Court of the United States, Revised Rules, Effective July 1, 1970, Rule 19(1)(b); Rule 21; Rule 22(3).

## C.

**QUESTIONS PRESENTED  
FOR REVIEW ON MERITS**

I. WHETHER COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY SUBSTITUTED ITS JUDGMENT ON THE FACTS FOR THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT.

II. WHETHER COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY VACATED JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT, AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS, AFTER PLAINTIFFS FAILED IN THEIR PROOF ON CLAIM OF VIOLATION BY DEFENDANTS OF SECURITIES & EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, §10(b); 15 U.S.C.A. §78j(b) (1970); AND IN ANY EVENT, WHETHER COURT OF APPEALS SET FORTH ERRONEOUS STANDARDS FOR RECOVERY IN 10b-5 CASE.

III. WHETHER COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY REJECTED DEFENSE OF "IN PARI DELICTO" AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND APPLIED IMPROPER STANDARDS FOR ITS APPLICABILITY, NOTWITHSTANDING TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL DETERMINATION THAT DEFENSE WAS ESTABLISHED.

## D.

**STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED**

**1. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,  
§10b; 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1970):**

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange—

. . .

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest for the protection of investors.

**2. S.E.C. Rule 10b-5; 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5  
(1974):**

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,

(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,

(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

**3. Securities Exchange Act of 1933, §4(2);  
15 U.S.C.A. §77(d)(2):**

The provisions of section 77(e) of this title shall not apply to . . . (2) transactions by an insurer not involving any public offering.

**E.**

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

**1. Proceedings Below**

The Plaintiffs (respondents here), SHIRLEY WOOLF and ROBERT MILBERG (hereinafter referred to as WOOLF and MILBERG), brought suit against the Defendants (petitioners here) S. D. COHN & COMPANY and SIDNEY D. COHN (hereinafter referred to as S. D. COHN & COMPANY and COHN), in the United States District Court, in and for the Southern District of Florida, to recover damages for the alleged violation of Rule 10(b)(5), adopted by the Securities And Exchange Commission pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Securities And Exchange Act

of 1934, in the purchase and sale of securities. The Defendants, S. D. COHN & COMPANY and COHN, filed an Answer and Counterclaim for securities fraud and breach of contract. The Defendants subsequently filed a Third Party Complaint against FIBERGLASS RESOURCES CORPORATION, the issuer of the debentures purchased by the Plaintiffs. The Third Party Defendant, FIBERGLASS RESOURCES CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as FIBERGLASS), responded to the Third Party Complaint with an Answer and affirmative defenses.

The cause came on for non-jury trial before Judge Norman C. Roettger, Jr., on January 8 and 9, 1973. After hearing all the evidence and testimony presented, the Court found in favor of the Defendants, S. D. COHN & COMPANY and COHN, and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law on May 22, 1973. No violations were found, and in any event, if there were violations, the Plaintiffs were in "pari delicto," found the trial court. (A. 57-68). Final Judgment in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiffs was accordingly entered on September 14, 1973, by the trial Court (A. 56), and post-trial motions were denied (A. 55).<sup>1</sup>

As we have seen, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings and testimony, on possible violations of 10b-5; and rejected the defense of in pari delicto.

<sup>1</sup>The Final Judgment, in accord with the findings of fact and conclusions of law, also granted judgment for the Counter-Defendants against the Counter-Plaintiffs and ordered that since the Defendants were not liable to the Plaintiffs, the Third Party Complaint was rendered moot. An order denying relief from the judgment of necessity was vacated (A. 8, 54; Appeal 71-2449).



## 2. The Facts Shown at Trial

The Defendant, COHN, was a general partner in the Defendant firm, S. D. COHN & COMPANY, which was a partnership registered as a broker-dealer in securities, pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

In mid-1968, COHN first became aware of FIBERGLASS RESOURCES CORPORATION through Jonas Medney who informed COHN of the opportunity for the new company to purchase the assets of the Lamtex division of Koppers Company, Inc.

Jonas Medney, the President of FIBERGLASS RESOURCES CORPORATION, started the Lamtex operation in 1955, and then sold the company to Koppers Co., Inc. in 1963, but remained as President of the Lamtex subsidiary of Koppers until 1968. Koppers purchased the Lamtex operation in 1963, for the amount of \$1,800,000. However, FIBERGLASS RESOURCES CORPORATION had the opportunity to purchase the assets of the Fiberglass reinforced plastic pipe factory of Lamtex for \$650,000. To raise the operating capital required by FIBERGLASS RESOURCES CORPORATION in the purchase of the Lamtex assets, FIBERGLASS authorized the issue of \$600,000.00 principal amount of its 6¼% convertible debentures. S. D. COHN & COMPANY, as a registered broker-dealer, was employed by FIBERGLASS RESOURCES CORPORATION to facilitate the private placement of the debentures, and in compensation for such services, S. D. COHN & COMPANY, would receive a commission of 7½% of the principal amount of the debentures sold as per paragraph ten of the Debenture Agreements. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11).

Based upon his knowledge of the situation, including his previous exposure to Medney as President of the Lamtex Division of Koppers, the Defendant, COHN, believed that purchase of FIBERGLASS debentures was an attractive investment.<sup>2</sup> (R. 274-275). While purchasing FIBERGLASS debentures on behalf of S. D. COHN & COMPANY (R. 312, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11), COHN notified the Plaintiff, MILBERG, a business and social acquaintance of COHN, of the opportunity to purchase such debentures. COHN provided MILBERG with the information concerning FIBERGLASS obtained from Medney. (R. 22-24, 268, 306, 336, 386). He told him all he knew about the proposed transaction. (A. 9). MILBERG then conveyed the investment opportunity to the other Plaintiff, WOOLF. (R. 28, 119). Each of the Plaintiffs paid \$50,000.00 for 6¼% convertible subordinate debentures of FIBERGLASS RESOURCES CORPORATION. (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 3, 11).

In the composite debenture agreement (PX. 2), signed by the Plaintiffs when they bought the bonds, they represented and warranted that they bought the bonds for investment only, and no other persons had a beneficial interest. MILBERG openly admitted this warranty, upon which FIBERGLASS relied in selling Plaintiffs the debentures, was untrue. (R. 71).

Prior to the purchase by the Plaintiffs in October, 1968, of the FIBERGLASS debentures, both MILBERG and WOOLF had substantial knowledge of the investment market. From 1952 to 1960, MILBERG was employed by Bache & Co., members of the New York Stock Exchange, as a salesman, account executive, and resident manager of

<sup>2</sup>COHN did advise the investors that the situation was highly speculative (R. 298-299, 337-338).

the Miami office. Following his affiliation with Bache & Co., MILBERG became a salesman for International Equities, an over-the-counter firm. In the mid-1960's, MILBERG was employed by Herzfeld, Stern and Hentz & Company as a customer's man. From March, 1969, to December, 1970, MILBERG was employed by the Defendant, S. D. COHN & COMPANY, as manager of the Miami office.

Prior to her purchase of FIBERGLASS debentures, WOOLF had made substantial investments in the stock market through S. D. COHN & COMPANY in the \$100,000 to \$200,000 range. WOOLF had known MILBERG for a considerable length of time, and MILBERG would chart stocks for Miss WOOLF and her investment partner, Harold Vineberg, in return for fifteen percent of the profits made on the stocks charted. (R. 199, 228, 238, 259). WOOLF, with Vineberg, traded heavily in many brokerage houses, not only S. D. COHN & COMPANY. Miss WOOLF has been a practicing lawyer in Florida for some 28 years since graduation from St. John Law School in Brooklyn, New York, and is a current member of the New York and Florida Bars. A significant portion of her practice entails commercial law, and among her clients was a New York finance company. (R. 165).

In August, 1968, a summary (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) was prepared by FIBERGLASS RESOURCES CORPORATION. The summary was furnished to COHN, however, COHN *did not* provide the summary to WOOLF and MILBERG since the summary was not intended for further distribution. (R. 294, 302, 389-390, 396, 415). At the time the summary was made, the projections and forecasts of the future prospects of FIBERGLASS RESOURCES

CORPORATION had a reasonable basis in fact and in method of preparation, and, if anything, the forecasts tended to be on the low side. In the summary, it was stated that "the remainder of 1968, is not shown except that a gross profit of \$225,000.00 and net after taxes of \$100,000.00 is shown due to the Pakistan job which is the condition of the purchase of the plant". (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). FIBERGLASS RESOURCES did in fact receive the Pakistan contract, supported by a letter of credit, thus opening the door for the purchase of the Lamtex plant. (R. 388-389).

Subsequent to the procurement of the Pakistan contract, FIBERGLASS RESOURCES was unexpectedly faced with revolution in Pakistan and an extensive dock strike. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 17, R. 89, 272, 401). As a result thereof, additional financing was required in 1969 by FIBERGLASS. (R. 401-404). In order to obtain additional financing, it was necessary for FIBERGLASS to convert the debentures into common stock. (R. 402-403). Accordingly, the holders of FIBERGLASS debentures, including WOOLF and MILBERG, were requested by FIBERGLASS to convert their debentures into common stock. (R. 403). The Plaintiffs, WOOLF and MILBERG, did convert their debentures into 16,666 shares each of FIBERGLASS RESOURCES CORPORATION stock, plus each Plaintiff received a check from FIBERGLASS in the amount of \$1,224.31 as interest on the debentures. (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 4, 12, 13, 14, 15).

At the time of the conversion of the debentures by the Plaintiffs, MILBERG visited the fiberglass plant in March of 1969, and was given a tour of the plant by Jonas Medney. In addition to the plant visit, MILBERG had a sub-



stantial number of telephone conversations with Medney, at which times MILBERG had complete access to all information regarding the financial condition of FIBERGLASS RESOURCES CORPORATION. (R. 87-88, 384-386). Additionally, WOOLF received financial statements of FIBERGLASS RESOURCES CORPORATION. (T. 224-225, 426, 428).

By letter of August 4, 1971 (Defendants' Exhibit 1), the Plaintiffs, WOOLF and MILBERG, represented to Jonas Medney of FIBERGLASS that although 16,666 shares of FIBERGLASS stock had been registered in each of their names, WOOLF and MILBERG were "in actuality, the nominees since the date of purchase for 22 Florida residents". The letter further represented that the various investors "evidenced great discontent" and "intended to communicate with the Chemical Bank directly". (Defendants' Exhibit 1). At trial, the Plaintiffs openly admitted that the representations were false when written. (R. 47, 49-53, 61, 161, 173-174). WOOLF and MILBERG manufactured the falsehood regarding twenty-two Florida purchasers to cause Medney to believe that the private placement of the debentures was to more than twenty-five people and thus raised the possibility of violation of the securities law regarding registration. (R. 161). Adding the alleged twenty-two Florida purchasers to the other few FIBERGLASS investors would come to more than twenty-five purchasers.

At the time the letter was written, FIBERGLASS was negotiating a loan through the Chemical Bank, and any possible violation of securities laws by FIBERGLASS could "blow the deal", using the language of the Plaintiffs. (R. 380-381). In direct reliance upon the misrepresenta-

tions of WOOLF and MILBERG contained in the August 4, 1971 letter to FIBERGLASS and without ever being informed that the misrepresentations were just that, FIBERGLASS purchased the 33,332 shares of FIBERGLASS stock registered in the Plaintiffs' names for \$35,000 on August 26, 1971. (R. 144, 382-384, Defendants' Exhibit 3). Upon repurchase of the 33,332 shares of WOOLF and MILBERG by FIBERGLASS, WOOLF and MILBERG executed a release which stated that "sellers (Plaintiffs) have received full financial data concerning the Company from the inception of the Company until and including the year ended June 30, 1971". (Defendants' Exhibit 3).

The actual number of participants in the purchase for \$100,000 of FIBERGLASS debentures in the Plaintiffs' names was neither twenty-two nor two, but instead seven. (R. 40, 141). Despite the existence of seven investors in the purchase of FIBERGLASS debentures in the Plaintiffs' names, WOOLF and MILBERG represented and warranted to FIBERGLASS at purchase of the debentures that they were acquiring the debentures for their own account for investment only and not with a view to distribution, and "no other person has any beneficial interest in, or right to acquire, the debentures". (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11, Paragraph 3 of additional terms of debenture agreement, Defendants' Exhibit 2, Paragraph 3 of additional terms of debenture agreement).

### 3. The Findings of the Trial Court

The facts are clearly set forth in the findings of the trial court. (A. 57-68). It is unnecessary to delve into them further here, except to state that the Defendants' testi-



mony and evidence were accepted, and the conflicting evidence of the Plaintiffs was rejected. The trial court concluded as follows:

"The evidence produced at trial clearly and convincingly showed that the plaintiffs did not establish any misrepresentations or omissions of material fact knowingly committed by the defendants and relied upon by the plaintiffs in the relevant securities transactions, and the defendants are not guilty of violating §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or Rule 10b-5 issued thereunder and are not liable to the plaintiffs."

The trial court also clearly held that:

"Regardless of the defendants' guilt or innocence, under Rule 10b-5, the plaintiffs would be precluded from recovery as a result of their own violations of §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 issued thereunder in their transactions with Fiberglass Resources Corporation. The defense of *in pari delicto* is applicable to the factual situation before this Court. . ." (A. 67).

The trial court also found that the Plaintiffs were sophisticated investors who had not shown the necessary degree of reliance in this case to entitle them to recovery; and found that the third-party claim was moot because the Defendants were not liable to the Plaintiffs. The court did not reach the defense of lack of indispensable parties, which had been raised by the Defendants. The Defendants, as counter-claimants, introduced no evidence of damages; therefore their counterclaim was rejected. (A. 67-68).

#### 4. The Opinion of the Fifth Circuit

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The opinion is extensive. It recites facts and acknowledges the conflicts in the evidence. (A. 11-22). Nevertheless, the opinion appears to reevaluate the facts and testimony—without even suggesting that the trial court's findings were "clearly erroneous". (See, e.g., A. 11-22). All of the material conflicts, however, were resolved in favor of the Defendants by the trial court.

Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit reversed and found that the "in pari delicto" defense was not available to the Defendants here, as a matter of law, because the misconduct of the Plaintiffs was not "mutual, simultaneous, and relatively equal", to the Defendants' alleged misconduct and securities law violations; and held that the Plaintiffs could be barred, only if they were active, essential and knowing participants in the unlawful activity. (A. 29). The Fifth Circuit held that the conduct of the Plaintiffs, while not to be condoned, did not bar the Plaintiffs from recovery here; and such a bar, for the type of misconduct in which they concededly indulged, would be inimical to the purposes of the securities laws.

Similarly, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that it was determining a novel question on the issue of whether or not a Rule 10b-5 violation could be shown here, and stated as follows:

"The difficult question this case presents—and, so far as our research shows, it is a novel one—is the extent to which rule 10b-5 provides a rem-

edy to a purchaser of securities against the issuer or others involved in the distribution when the issuer and its agents fail to conduct the distribution in such a manner that it qualifies for the exemption from registration provided by §4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C., §77(d) (2) (1970)." (A. 33).

The Fifth Circuit held that there was such a remedy, and the Defendants could be liable here, for non-disclosure (without affirmative proof of reliance) under 10b-5; for failure to conduct the sale in such a way as to obtain the benefit of the exemption for private placements, provided the non-disclosures were sufficiently important. The Fifth Circuit also held that in a private offering, the issuers and their agents were obliged to furnish information beyond that which would be required in registration. The cause was reversed to afford the Plaintiffs a further opportunity to prove their case because of alleged record inadequacies on the nature of the offering and information conveyed. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held as follows:

"On the present record, we cannot say whether the transaction here qualified as a private offering under §4(2) of the 1933 Act. We have indicated some of the inadequacies in the record, and, on remand, the burden is on the defendants to establish the availability of the exemption. The unusual aspect of this case, however, is that even if the defendants should fail to demonstrate the availability of the exemption, the plaintiffs may fail to recover the balance of the purchase price. For the plaintiffs did not bring suit under §12 of the 1933 Act but rather under §10b of the 1934

Act and Rule 10b-5. It follows that they must show that the omissions or misrepresentations of information that make §4(2) exemption unavailable to the defendants, in their cumulative effect, was such that a reasonable investor, at the information registration would have afforded been available, might have considered them important in the making of his investment decision." (A. 52).

The Fifth Circuit adhered to its decision and opinion, in a further opinion on rehearing. (A. 1-7). This petition followed.

## F.

### REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

#### I. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY SUBSTITUTED ITS JUDGMENT ON FACTS FOR THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT

The trial court entered extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. They reflect clear and convincing evidence that no material misrepresentations and no material non-disclosures were made and relied upon by these sophisticated investors. There were no 10b-5 violations. The trial court made specific findings after an extensive summary of the evidence (A. 57-68). Those findings were not "clearly erroneous" or found to be clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit should not have reversed; *U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co.*, 333 U.S.364, 68 S.Ct.525; Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The findings on both absence of violations of 10b-5 by the defendants; and on the defense

of "in pari delicto" thus should have been permitted to stand. There is no basis for reversal, on the clear-cut findings here; and such a reversal of course was precluded by Rule 52(a), and the U.S. GYPSUM Co. case. Most respectfully, the writ should be granted because of this apparent violation of cardinal principle of appellate review in the Federal Court system.

II. COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY VACATED JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF TRIAL COURT, AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS, AFTER THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED IN THEIR PROOF ON CLAIMS OF VIOLATION BY DEFENDANTS OF SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, §10b, 15 U.S.C.A. §78j(b); AND RULE 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.240.10b-5 (1974); AND IN ANY EVENT, COURT OF APPEALS SET FORTH ERRONEOUS STANDARDS FOR RECOVERY IN 10b-5 CASE.

The plaintiffs failed in their proof. There was no basis here whatsoever for a reversal, and remand for further proceedings. Either the plaintiffs proved their case or they didn't — and the Fifth Circuit has at least implicitly held that they did not. We find nothing in the law which permits remand for further proceedings to the end that the plaintiffs may have another bite at the apple. They did not prove any 10b-5 violations, and there the matter must rest. The "inadequacies" of the record are not the problem of the defendants-petitioners. Nor do we agree with the resolution by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit of what it has deemed a novel question.

The Fifth Circuit has held that a 10b-5 violation may arise when an issuer fails to conduct a distribution in such a manner as to qualify for the private placement exemption from registration provided by §4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. As a matter of fact, suit here was not even brought here under §12 of the 1933 Act (15 U.S.C. §77(l)) (1970); for failure to comply with registration requirements. Clearly, the placement here was a private one, which cannot be seriously contested here, even under the Fifth Circuit view set forth in *Hill York Corp. v. American Int. Franchises*, 5 Cir. 1971, 448 F.2d 680; despite the opinion below. The gravamen of the action was for fraud or misrepresentation or material non-disclosures. None were shown. A public offering or non-exempt offering with non-registration was not claimed. No 10b-5 violation can nor does exist here.

The Fifth Circuit found that a 10b-5 violation could arise out of alleged violations of the 1933 Act in the area of private offerings. The Fifth Circuit in its opinion, (A. 37), then held that in the area of a private placement, the duty to provide information by the issuer was to furnish *more than* the information which registration would have revealed (A. 43-52). It relied upon its own decision in *S.E.C. v. Continental Tobacco Co.*, 5 Cir. 1972, 463 F.2d 137. In the first place, nothing else in the law or securities legislation required, as the Fifth Circuit seemed to do, that an issuer of a private placement was to be charged with the duty of conveying information beyond what registration in the case of public placement would reveal. The Fifth Circuit alone appears to have imposed this duty.

In the second place, the record here reveals that indeed the plaintiffs failed to prove any violation anyhow, or any



failure to impart any information material or otherwise (A. 38). They have not shown failure of the defendants to convey any material information. To the contrary, Mr. Cohn had imparted to Mr. Milberg "all the information on Fiberglass" that Cohn believed to be true and accurate (A. 38). The onerous burden sought to be imposed here is beyond anything reflected in the law of securities in other circuits.

The court below has held that failure to convey information, beyond that even required in registration, rules out the exemption of §4(2). But a remedy for registration violations or violations in connection with non-exempt offerings, is provided (15 U.S.C. §77(l)). No suit was brought under those provisions. The Fifth Circuit, in a 10b-5 case, nevertheless seems to impose upon the defendants the obligation of proving they fall within the exemption and that they have conveyed the Fifth Circuit formulation of sufficient information in a 10b-5 fraud case. While the burden of proof might be on the issuer in other areas of the law, where there is a regulatory suit, or other suit brought under 15 U.S.C. §77(e) or (l); and the §4(2) exemption is claimed, *S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co.*, 346 U.S. 119, 126 73 S.Ct. 981, 985, the plaintiff, in a 10b-5 case, has the burden of proof and simply has not met it here. *Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co.*, 9 Cir. 1970, 430 F.2d 1202, 1209; *Mader v. Armel*, 6 Cir. 1968, 402 F.2d 158, 163, cert. den., 1969, 88 S.Ct. 1188. The defendants were not sued for the unlawful sale of unregistered securities (15 U.S.C. §77e, 77(1) (1970)). They were sued for unlawful trick or device or for fraud or misrepresentation or non-disclosure. They failed to prove fraud, or non-disclosure and damages. And while reliance in a 10b-5 case may be presumed in a case of material non-disclosure,

under certain circumstances, *Affiliated UTE Citizens of the State of Utah v. U.S.*, 406 U.S. 128, 92 S.Ct. 1456, here reliance was — in essence — negated. (A. 40). There was no basis for reversal. We fail to see how a new trial now can be afforded to the plaintiffs, who failed in their proofs — to the end that they might have further opportunity to prove what they failed to prove in the first instance. Moreover, by their own trick, artifice and device, the Plaintiffs resold the debentures, when they could have avoided loss by holding them; and signed a release; and a "rescission" remedy is impossible.

### III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY REJECTED DEFENSE OF "IN PARI DELICTO" AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND APPLIED IMPROPER STANDARDS FOR ITS APPLICABILITY, NOTWITHSTANDING TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL DETERMINATION THAT DEFENSE WAS ESTABLISHED.

In *Kuehnert v. Texstar Corporation*, 412 F.2d 700 (5 Cir. 1969) the Fifth Circuit itself stated that the equitable doctrines of *in pari delicto* and unclean hands are defenses available in private 10b-5 litigation, although the application of such defenses rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. See also, *Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine*, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5 Cir. 1970).

The applicability of the defenses of *in pari delicto* and unclean hands to the case at bar is in no way limited or discounted by the case of *Katz v. Amos Treat & Co.*, 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969), cited below. In refusing to foreclose the plaintiff from seeking relief under section 12 (1) of the 1933 Securities Act due to the plaintiff's

own violation of the securities provision, the Second Circuit in *Katz* held "the case is not one where [the plaintiff] so made himself a part of the basic violation that recovery should be denied on the basis of *in pari delicto*". *Id.* at 1054. As supporting authority, the *Katz* opinion refers to *Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck*, 331 F.2d 371, 373-374 (10 Cir. 1964), wherein the plaintiff "at no time had the degree of culpability attributed to the defendants and should not be considered as *in pari delicto*." In fact, the Court in *Kuehnert* emphasized that the case before it was "not a case of mere knowledge of another party's wrongdoing, without active participation", and reference was made to *Can-Am Petroleum Co.* as just such a case of passive participation. *Kuehnert* at 703.

Furthermore, the Second Circuit in *Katz* mentions the contrasting case of *Athas v. Day*, 186 F.Supp. 385 (D. Colo. 1960). The contrasting aspect of the *Athas* case is the active participation of the plaintiff in the alleged fraudulent sale of stock; thus, the plaintiff was barred from recovery against the defendant.

In the present case the culpability of the Plaintiffs in violating Rule 10b-5 was equal to, if not greater than, any alleged wrongdoing on the part of the Defendants. One major difference is the uncontradicted nature of the Plaintiffs' admitted securities fraud perpetrated upon the third-party defendant, FIBERGLASS. In its conclusions of Law, the trial Court clearly distinguished the *Katz* case from this case.

Plaintiffs rely heavily upon *Katz v. Amos Treat & Co.*, 411 F.2d 1046 (2 Cir. 1969) and claim it cannot be distinguished from the instant case.

Quite to the contrary, there is nothing in the evidence in the instant case to show Defendant's conduct came within a fraction of the outrageous activities of the Defendant-broker in *Katz*, such as staging "a dog and pony show" at the plant of the corporation in question to assure prospective purchasers of the thriving nature of the corporation's business. In addition, Katz was duped and tricked at one stage after another and understandably the Second Circuit held he was not in *in pari delicto* with the defendants. On the other hand, in the instant case Plaintiffs' letter of August 4th, 1971 was an admittedly false bluff which caused FIBERGLASS to purchase Plaintiffs' shares of stock. (A. 67).

By letter of August 4, 1971, WOOLF and MILBERG provided formal notice to FIBERGLASS through its president, Jones Medney, that although 16,666 shares of Fiberglass stock are registered in each of the plaintiffs' names, the plaintiffs are actually the nominees for 22 Florida residents. (Defendants' Exhibit 1). Such a statement was admitted to be false by both plaintiffs. The reason for making such a false statement was to get action from FIBERGLASS, since the Plaintiffs and Medney were well aware that if in fact there were twenty-two Florida purchasers rather than just the two Plaintiffs, then the otherwise private offering by the issuer, FIBERGLASS, might be considered to be public (more than 25 purchasers) and raise the specter of a violation by FIBERGLASS of the registration provisions of the securities laws on the grounds of a public offering of unregistered stock. (R. 161). To further gain the attention of FIBERGLASS, the Plaintiff made the additional material misrep-



resentation in the August 4, 1971 letter that other co-investors intended to communicate with the Chemical Bank, with whom FIBERGLASS was attempting to obtain a loan from. Medney testified that notice to the Chemical Bank of a possible securities violation by FIBERGLASS would jeopardize the loan. (R. 379). In reliance solely on the misrepresentations communicated to it by the plaintiffs, FIBERGLASS purchased on August 16, 1971 the 33,332 shares of stock held by the Plaintiffs for the sum of \$35,000. (R. 379-384).

According to Medney, FIBERGLASS would not have purchased the Plaintiffs' stock had it known there were not *twenty-two purchasers* as per the August 4, 1971 letter and that investors were not going to the Chemical Bank. (R. 383-384). FIBERGLASS could ill-afford to be faced with a registration violation as alluded to in the August 4, 1971 letter at the time it was seeking a vital loan from the Chemical Bank. The aforescribed fraudulent acts of the Plaintiffs constituted a clear-cut violation of Rule 10b-5. All the necessary elements of a 10b-5 violation were present. The statements of the Plaintiffs as to the twenty-two purchasers and informing the Chemical Bank were material misrepresentations of fact and the Plaintiffs knew the statements were totally false when made. FIBERGLASS, by relying on such false and fraudulent statements, was proximately damaged to the extent of \$35,000. The plaintiffs utilized the interstate mails to employ a scheme to defraud FIBERGLASS. Therefore, even if the Defendants were found to have violated Rule 10b-5 by defrauding the Plaintiffs, which cannot be the case, the Plaintiffs nevertheless would be unable to recover from the Defendants as a result of their own violation of Rule 10b-5, which places them *in pari delicto* with the

Defendants. The Plaintiffs' hands are not so clean as to entitle them to relief against the Defendants whose hands were not even soiled.

The hands of the Plaintiffs were further dirtied by other acts done by them relating to the transaction in issue. In the composite Debenture Agreement (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11, Defendants' Exhibit 2), representing the Plaintiffs' purchase of debentures of FIBERGLASS and which was executed by the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs represented and warranted that they purchased the debentures for investment only and no other person, besides MILBERG and WOOLF, had any beneficial interest in the debentures. MILBERG admitted that the representation was untrue since there were other beneficial interests in the debentures purported to be purchased by the Plaintiffs. (R. 71). Again, the plaintiffs violated Rule 10b-5 by making a misrepresentation of material fact in the purchase of securities, and FIBERGLASS relied on such misrepresentation by agreeing to sell debentures to the Plaintiffs in the belief that the Plaintiffs were not purchasing the debentures on behalf of other investors. This misrepresentation inhered right in the original purchase.

The Plaintiffs committed fraud both in the purchase and sale of the FIBERGLASS securities. The unconscionable conduct of the Plaintiffs throughout the course of the transaction in issue bars them from any recovery against the Defendants, if recovery were appropriate which it properly was not.

The application or rejection of the clean hands doctrine in a given case is equitable in nature and within the discretion of the trial court. *Kuehnert v. Texstar*



*Corporation*, 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5 Cir. 1969). The trial Court, upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances, properly exercised its discretion in applying the doctrines to preclude the Plaintiffs from recovery.

Though the Plaintiffs argued and the Fifth Circuit found, that the equitable defenses are inapplicable since the Plaintiffs' fraud was *unrelated* to the subject matter in litigation, the reality is that the Plaintiffs' misconduct is part and parcel of the transactions in issue. The doctrine of unclean hands is applicable "to misconduct in relation to or in all events connected with the matter in litigation so that it in some manner affects the equitable relations of the parties to the suit." *McCullough Tool Company v. Well Surveys, Inc.*, 395 F.2d 230, 238 (10 Cir. 1968).

Unquestionably, the fraudulent conduct of the Plaintiffs is intimately connected with the suit brought by the Plaintiffs for alleged securities fraud committed by the Defendants in the sale of the FIBERGLASS debentures to the Plaintiffs for \$100,000 with the alleged loss resulting from their re-purchase by FIBERGLASS for \$35,000. In the purchase of the debentures by the Plaintiffs, the Defendants participated as brokers for FIBERGLASS. If the Defendants can be sued for fraud in the purchase of the debentures by the Plaintiffs from the issuer, FIBERGLASS, it is only fair that the Plaintiffs be allowed to assert that the hands of the Plaintiffs were unclean in the purchase of the debentures from FIBERGLASS.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup>Additionally, at the time of the purchase of the debentures, S. D. COHN & CO. possessed 100,000 shares of FIBERGLASS stock and COHN was an officer and director of FIBERGLASS. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11, Defendants' Exhibit 2).

Likewise, the fraud perpetrated by the Plaintiffs in obtaining the purchase of their interests by FIBERGLASS for \$35,000 is a necessarily-connected transaction in the chain of purchase and sale of the securities in issue and is directly related to the events pertaining to the matter in litigation.

Despite the contention of the Plaintiffs that the fraud in the re-purchase of the securities did not affect the Defendants, the interests of the Defendants were directly affected by the re-purchase. As a substantial stockholder in FIBERGLASS, S. D. COHN & CO. had a vested interest in all transactions conducted by FIBERGLASS, especially a pay-out of \$35,000 to re-purchase FIBERGLASS stock. Since each shareholder owns a part of the corporation, a fraud perpetrated upon the corporation of necessity is a fraud upon the shareholders. There should have been no reversal.

G.

**CONCLUSION**

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted and the decision and judgments of the United States Court of Appeals For the Fifth Circuit should be quashed and reversed, with directions to reinstate the judgment and order of the trial court. Certainly, most respectfully, this Court should review this matter. The Fifth Circuit itself has determined that it has passed upon a novel question of federal securities law. Accordingly, under Rule 19b of the Rules of this Court, certiorari review is indicated because the Court of Appeals "has decided an important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court". Moreover, departures from the clearly erroneous rule are indicated here, further warranting review of this Court in an important area of federal law.\*

Respectfully submitted,

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BY \_\_\_\_\_

ROBERT ORSECK

\*In a separate appeal, the plaintiffs in the trial court sought relief from the final judgment (No. 74-2449), under Rule 60b, claiming that the judgment was obtained by false testimony. That appeal was consolidated with the main appeal (No. 73-4014). The Fifth Circuit found it unnecessary, apparently, to resolve the issues on the 60(b) appeal. Needless to say, the trial court had denied that application (A. 8, 54).

H.

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that three true copies of the foregoing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and Appendix has been mailed this \_\_\_\_day of January, 1976 to: Richard E. Reckson, 3501 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida; and to Terrence Russell, 900 N.E. 26 Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, Attorneys for Respondents, in accordance with Rule 33 of this Court.

BY \_\_\_\_\_

ROBERT ORSECK

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**APPENDIX A**

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

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Nos. 73-4044, 74-2449.

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Shirley WOOLF and Robert Milberg,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

S. D. COHN & COMPANY and Sidney  
D. Cohn, Defendants Third-Party  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
FIBERGLASS RESOURCES CORPORATION,  
Third-Party  
Defendant

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Shirley WOOLF et al.,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants.

v.

S. D. COHN & COMPANY et al.,  
Defendants Third-Party  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

FIBERGLASS RESOURCES CORPORATION,  
Third-Party  
Defendant-Appellee.

Oct. 15, 1975.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the  
Southern District of Florida.



## ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

Before RIVES, WISDOM and COLEMAN, Circuit Judges.

## PER CURIAM:

We consider it appropriate to write a short opinion in denying the petition for rehearing.

[1] The petitioners urge that this Court was in error in declining to allow the *in pari delicto* defense on the facts of this case. We remain convinced that our analysis of the *in pari delicto* problem in this case is correct. The doctrine, of course, arose in the English Chancery, where cases typically involved purely private disputes between private individuals. Long before the creation of our present day comprehensive federal regulatory schemes governing commerce and finance, the doctrine had been refined to require that the alleged wrongdoing of a plaintiff bear an immediate and necessary relationship to the equitable relief that he sought from the court. In cases implementing these comprehensive regulatory systems, however, an additional requirement appears to have developed. One way to express it is that used by Judge Aldrich in *Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.*, 5 Cir. 1969, 412 F.2d 700: In determining whether to allow the *in pari delicto* defense, the court must also give consideration to "which decision will have the better consequences in promoting the objective of the securities laws by increasing the protection to be afforded the investing public."

Closely related to this concern with the impact a common law defense might have on the implementation of strong federal regulatory objectives is the treatment accorded the defense by the United States Supreme Court in the antitrust area. This development stretches back a good many years further than the development in the securities area, but that is only because the private action in the securities area has only recently assumed a role of signal importance. Two of the leading cases in the antitrust area are *Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons*, 1951, 340 U.S. 211, 71 S.Ct. 259, 95 L.Ed. 219, and *Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.*, 1968, 392 U.S. 134, 88 S.Ct. 1981, 20 L.Ed.2d 982; we make further mention of a third here. In *Simpson v. Union Oil Co.*, 1964, 377 U.S. 13, 84 S.Ct. 1051, 12 L.Ed.2d 98, a lessee of a major oil company who operated a retail gasoline station was allowed to proceed with his private treble damage action against the company despite the fact that he had voluntarily entered into the lease and participated actively in the "consignment" system and had assisted in the resale price maintenance scheme effected thereby. And, of course, four years later, in the *Perma Life* case, the Supreme Court stated flatly that "We . . . hold that the doctrine of *in pari delicto*, with its complex scope, contents, and effects, is not to be recognized as a defense to an antitrust action." 392 U.S. at 140, 88 S.Ct. at 1985.

[2] The problem of reconciling the traditional equitable defenses with the policies served by the emerging private rights of action under the federal securities laws has not yet reached the United States Supreme Court, to be sure. It is true that the private action is expressly established by statute in the antitrust area, and has been allowed in the securities area as a matter of judicial in-

terpretation. That is not such a great difference, particularly when we consider that the common law defenses themselves are judicially fashioned doctrines. Moreover, the same important functions of deterring violations and of compensating victims can readily be ascribed both to the private treble damage antitrust action and to the private rights of action that have been implied under the Securities Acts. True, the *in pari delicto* defense has expressly been recognized in limited circumstances in securities fraud cases. The two major cases in the area are both in this Circuit, and are discussed in this panel's original opinion. The requirement has emerged in *James v. DuBreuil*, 5 Cir. 1974, 500 F.2d 155, that the fault of the parties must be "clearly mutual, simultaneous, and relatively equal". Moreover, the effect on the investing public or on the implementation of important features of the regulatory scheme must be so small as to permit the Court to conclude that allowing the defense would not interfere with "the objective of the securities laws [of] increasing the protection to be afforded the investing public", as Judge Aldrich noted in the earlier *Kuehnert* case, 412 F.2d at 704.

The disturbing thing about the present case is that abuses in the area of private placements strike at the very heart of the protections the Securities Acts seek to afford investors, for, as noted in our original opinion, no requirements of reporting to the S.E.C. are imposed upon issuers and their agents who undertake to issue new securities under the protective cloak of the Section 4(2) exemption. The scarce enforcement resources of the S.E.C. are adequate only to police the most flagrant and widespread abuses in the private placement area. The private action therefore arguably occupies an even more important

place in the area of private placements than in other areas of Securities Act enforcement where activities of an issuer must both be reported to and approved by the S.E.C.

[3] We concede that the plaintiffs in this case are not free from sin. But the question is not the purity of the plaintiffs in an abstract sense, but rather whether their fault was equal, simultaneous, and vital to the effectuation of the fraudulent scheme (as the cooperation of a co-conspirator is vital to the accomplishment of the ends of a conspiracy); and whether the remedial purposes of the securities laws will be furthered more by allowing the defense than by disallowing it. We remain convinced that the plaintiffs' fault did not rise to the level that should bar their 10b-5 action. The fault of the parties is not equal, simultaneous, and mutual, even if this were a purely private action seeking to vindicate purely private rights. The importance role such actions play in enforcing the Securities Acts, however, resolves the doubt in favor of the plaintiffs here.

The appellees also contend that we have confounded the purpose of Rule 10b-5 with that of Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act. This contention is without merit. In the broadest terms, this case involves what information and how much information an issuer and its agent (in this case S. D. Cohn and Company) must disclose to potential investors in the private placement context. Though the record at this stage is inconclusive on the point, it strongly suggests to us that the defendants in this case knowingly attempted to take advantage of the private placement exemption from registration and in the process failed to state material facts that a reasonably prudent investor would take



into account in making his investment decision. We outlined in our original opinion a number of highly relevant items of information that might affect a prudent investor's decision. So far as the present record indicates, these were not revealed to the offerees in this transaction. More specifically, a large amount of what the registration process would have brought to the attention of potential investors was not disclosed. We are aware that the S.E.C. announced certain amendments to its new Rule 146 shortly before our original opinion in this cause was announced. These amendments, *inter alia*, allow non-reporting issuers seeking to take advantage of the new rule to omit certain non-material information, to condense certain material, and to omit financial statements of the sort required by Part II of a registration statement, in their communications with prospective purchasers. In our original opinion, we referred to new Rule 146 in our discussion of the disclosure that must be made to prospective purchasers on the private placement context. We wish to make it clear that the amendments to Rule 146 do not alter our conclusions there.

[4] We relied upon the law that had developed under Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act to provide a yardstick for judging the propriety of business practices in the private placement area. Not every failure to qualify for the Section 4(2) exemption rises to the level of a violation of Rule 10b-5. We noted that 10b-5 liability could be predicated on omissions to disclose information that our case law in this circuit on private placements required to be disclosed. Depending on the amount of information the defendants failed to disclose to offerees and its materiality to the transaction, there comes a point where the failure to disclose can be characterized as a violation of the third

clause of Rule 10b-5, if not of the first two clauses. We wish to ensure that, on remand, the district judge will focus not so much upon specific misrepresentations that were alleged (as he did in his earlier consideration of the case), but will also be aware of the stringent disclosure requirements our Court has held necessary in the private placement context. Although our decisions have broadened the concept of what is "material" in the area of private placements, we do not mean to imply that every failure to comply either with Rule 146 or with the judge-made law on qualifying for the Section 4(2) exemption would give rise to 10b-5 liability.

The petition for rehearing is therefore denied, and, no Judge in active service having requested that the cause be reheard *en banc* (see Local Rule 12), the petition for rehearing *en banc* is also denied.

App. 8

**APPENDIX B**

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit  
October Term, 1974

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No. 74-2449

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SHIRLEY WOOLF, ET AL.,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
v.

S. D. COHN & COMPANY, ET AL.,  
Defendants-Third Party  
Plaintiffs-Appellees.

**JUDGMENT**

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and was argued by counsel;

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, vacated, and that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said District Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this Court;

It is further ordered that plaintiffs-appellants be condemned to pay one-third of the costs on appeal to be taxed by the Clerk of this Court; and that defendants-third party plaintiffs-appellees be condemned to pay two-thirds of said costs.

App. 9

**EXHIBIT B-1**

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit  
October Term, 1974

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No. 73-4044

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SHIRLEY WOOLF and ROBERT MILBERG,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
v.

S. D. COHN & COMPANY and SIDNEY D. COHN,  
Defendants-Third Party  
Plaintiffs-Appellees.

**JUDGMENT**

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and was argued by counsel;

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, vacated, and that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said District Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this Court;

It is further ordered that plaintiffs-appellants be condemned to pay one-third of the costs on appeal to be taxed by the Clerk of this Court; and that defendants-third party plaintiffs-appellees be condemned to pay two-thirds of said costs.

## APPENDIX C

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Nos. 73-4044, 74-2449.

WOOLF v. S. D. COHN & COMPANY et al.

July 3, 1975.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before RIVES, WISDOM and COLEMAN, Circuit Judges.

WISDOM, Circuit Judge:

The plaintiffs-appellants, Shirley Woolf and Robert Milberg, brought this action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970),<sup>1</sup> and rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974),<sup>2</sup> against S. D. Cohn & Co.,

<sup>1</sup>15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970):

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange—  
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.

<sup>2</sup>17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974):

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,

(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,

a partnership registered as a broker-dealer under the Securities Exchange Act, and S. D. Cohn, a general partner in that company. The appellants sought to recover the balance of the purchase price they had paid for certain convertible debentures of the Fiberglass Resources Corporation which they had subsequently converted into shares of common stock in that corporation and later sold to another major shareholder or to the issuer. They contend that they were induced to participate in the "private placement" of the debentures which were not registered under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq., by certain material misrepresentations or omissions to state material facts on the part of Cohn and S. D. Cohn & Co. in violation of rule 10b-5.

The defendants filed a "counterclaim" charging that the plaintiffs had concealed from the issuer and from the defendants that they were purchasing the debentures for a number of individuals in addition to themselves and that Milberg was receiving a commission on at least a portion of the transaction. The defendants also filed a third party complaint against Fiberglass Resources Corporation, the issuer, predicated upon the theory that, if there were any misrepresentations or omissions of material facts regarding the sale of the debentures, these were the "sole responsibility" of Fiberglass. They say that the "totality of the representations concerning the financial condition and

(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.



future prospects" of Fiberglass were "prepared and formulated exclusively by [Fiberglass] for dissemination by the defendants".

The trial court, sitting without a jury, characterized the plaintiffs as "sophisticated investors", and found that the defendants had not violated rule 10b-5. Accordingly, the district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. We vacate that judgment and remand for further proceedings.

### I.

The predecessor of Fiberglass, a firm called Lamtex Industries, Inc., was formed in 1955. From the beginning, it specialized in the manufacture of products out of fiberglass and epoxy resins, particularly pipe, tubing, and casings of various sorts and with various commercial and military applications. The engineering expertise of Jonas Medney, president of Fiberglass, who was involved with Lamtex from its inception, played an important part in product development. In 1960, the firm "went public" with a public offering of registered securities underwritten by S. D. Cohn & Company. The offering was successful and the price of the shares offered rose from the offering price of \$5 to \$28. In July 1963, Koppers Company acquired Lamtex as a wholly owned subsidiary. In 1965 Koppers financed Lamtex's entry into the manufacture of reinforced plastic pipe. Many technological problems were encountered. New manufacturing equipment had to be designed and the plant had to be rebuilt. Manufacture of the product lines Lamtex had developed before its acquisition by Koppers was carried out at another plant.

In early 1968 technological difficulties incident to fully automated production of reinforced plastic pipe were, according to Mr. Medney, largely solved. Nonetheless, at that time Koppers made known its willingness to sell the pipe production facilities. (Koppers wished to retain that portion of the Lamtex subsidiary engaged in the manufacture of the original product lines, and did so.) Mr. Medney had served as president of the Lamtex subsidiary since 1965. Because of his familiarity with the development of the firm and his technological expertise, he became interested in forming a new company to purchase the facilities of the Lamtex subsidiary involved in pipe production. He approached Sidney Cohn of S. D. Cohn & Co., who had supervised the 1960 public offering of Lamtex shares. Mr. Cohn devised a "front money deal" involving the sale of debentures of the company newly formed to acquire the Koppers plastic facilities, the Fiberglass Resources Corporation. He hoped to take advantage of the exemption from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act for "transactions by an issuer [of securities] not involving any public offering" afforded by § 4(2) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).

Fiberglass accordingly authorized the issue of \$600,000 principal amount of 6¼ percent subordinated convertible debentures. For its services in connection with the sale of the debentures, Fiberglass agreed to pay S. D. Cohn & Co. 7½ percent of the principal amount of the debentures sold, in accordance with the debenture agreement entered into by Fiberglass and the purchasers. Mr. Cohn testified at trial, however, that he also received 10 percent of the debentures issued. He conceded that this was a larger commission than that usually charged by an underwriter, but stated that this was not uncommon in private place-

ments with which he was familiar. He did not seek approval of this level of compensation from the National Association of Securities Dealers or any other regulatory body. Mr. Cohn further testified that he was certain that the full extent of his compensation was disclosed to the investors. He could not remember how this information had been disclosed, but he thought that it was in the debenture agreement. Examination of that document reveals disclosure only of compensation in the amount of 7½ percent of the principal amount sold. There is no mention of an additional 10 percent participation in the debentures.

The testimony regarding the disclosure of material information respecting the Fiberglass Resources Corporation made to the offerees of these debentures is, of course, in conflict. In part, this conflict is attributable to the fact that Miss Woolf, Mr. Milberg, and Mr. Cohn had close business relations among themselves in a variety of transactions before the sale of the Fiberglass debentures, and therefore their communications regarding the Fiberglass transaction were informal. Mr. Milberg had been employed as the manager of the Miami office of S.D. Cohn & Company from March 1969 to December 1970. He had extensive first-hand knowledge of the investment business; had worked for Bache & Co.; and had worked for brokerage businesses in Miami. Mr. Cohn was often his houseguest when he visited Miami to keep in touch with the office there. Miss Woolf, an attorney who had practised in Florida for twenty-eight years, was the owner of the office building in which S. D. Cohn's office was located. She was a friend of Mr. Milberg and had made substantial investments in the stock market through the defendants in the amounts of \$200,000, \$150,000, and

\$100,000, before she purchased the Fiberglass debentures. She had had dealings with Mr. Cohn before, at least in her capacity as landlord.

Mr. Cohn testified that he informed Mr. Milberg of the investment opportunity presented by the Fiberglass debentures. All information, he said, was imparted orally. He said that he never had any direct contact with Miss Woolf, but that Mr. Milberg served as an intermediary between them. He understood at the time that Mr. Milberg was acting as an investment advisor for Miss Woolf. He conceded that he had some conversations with Miss Woolf respecting Fiberglass, but he said these took place "long after" the sale of debentures had been completed.

The plaintiffs introduced a "summary" consisting of nineteen typewritten, single-spaced pages, including a four-paragraph introductory statement, a "history" of the operations of the predecessors of the proposed Fiberglass Resources Corporation, Lamtex, and the Lamtex subsidiary of Koppers, a description of the "market" the new company hoped to serve and of the "principals" who would manage the new company, and "five year financial projections". This document was prepared by Mr. Medney and his assistant, Mr. Klimpl, at the request of Mr. Cohn. Mr. Medney testified that he revised the document to take into account suggestions and criticisms Mr. Cohn had made regarding the first draft. Mr. Cohn, however, testified that he did not intend that this "summary" be circulated to offerees of the debentures. Testimony at a deposition, introduced at trial, casts some doubt on whether this summary was circulated among prospective purchasers, for, when asked about the financial projections contained in the summary, Mr. Cohn said:



"I did not believe them. I instructed all our investors not to believe them. Certainly Mr. Milberg knew better than to believe them."

There is no suggestion in the record why Mr. Cohn would request the summary and suggest changes in the draft but later conclude that the projections contained in the summary were unworthy of belief. He did testify that his firm needed a source for the representations it made to prospective purchasers, and that this was the reason he had asked Mr. Medney to prepare the statement in the first place. It was on the basis of the summary, and on eight years' acquaintance with the performance of Mr. Medney, Mr. Cohn testified, that he permitted his brokerage firm to become involved in the transaction in the first place. He did not try to obtain either for himself or for prospective investors the financial history of the Lamtex subsidiary of Koppers. He explained that those statements were probably inaccurate in that Koppers charged overhead from other operations to Lamtex, and the small independent successor corporation they envisioned would in any event be able to operate at much lower overhead than the Lamtex subsidiary. Koppers was retaining some of the lines of manufacture pursued by Lamtex before its acquisition and disposing of others developed after the acquisition. Accordingly, Mr. Cohn said, he "told [prospective investors] that we were not buying the same company but a more improved [sic] one for less money." In the "history" section, the summary did reflect the fact that Koppers was retaining some of the facilities.

How much else the potential investors in Fiberglass knew and how they found it out are not clear from the record. Indeed, the record reveals very little regarding

the offerees of the debentures or their number. Mr. Cohn testified that there were ten investors in the \$600,000 offering, but did not say whether there had been more offerees. Although his testimony is not clear on the point, apparently Mr. Cohn imparted all the information regarding the investment opportunity in Fiberglass to the offerees orally, either in person or over the telephone. He emphatically denied sending the summary prepared by Mr. Medney to either of the plaintiffs, and counsel implied that Mr. Milberg might have obtained it himself in the course of his employment in the Miami office of S. D. Cohn & Co. When Mr. Cohn was pressed to disclose just what information he had given to the prospective investors, he said that he could not recall the specific representations. He insisted, however, that, with the exception of the financial history of the Lamtex subsidiary under Koppers' management with Mr. Medney as president of the division, S. D. Cohn & Co. disclosed to offerees "everything we knew" about the proposed transaction.

It is not clear from Mr. Cohn's testimony how much of the information contained in the summary was imparted to the offerees. Some of the representations in the summary came under scrutiny at trial, for example: the statement that "[b]ecause one of the principals in the new company was until recently the President of this Koppers subsidiary [Lamtex], the purchase of the assets [of the 'fiberglass reinforced plastic pipe factory'] in reality becomes the purchase of a going business"; the statement that "[w]ith \$600,000 cash as seed money and suitable bank credit, the company will be profitable and self-generating"; and the statement that "a [projected] gross profit of \$225,000 and net after taxes of \$100,000 [for fiscal year 1968] is shown due to the Pakistan job



which is a condition of the purchase of the plant." At trial it developed that the "Pakistan job" was a contract with the government of Pakistan for the manufacture of reinforced plastic pipe. Fiberglass obtained the contract. Payment was to be by a conditional letter of credit payable upon shipment of the finished goods. Fiberglass performed its part of the agreement, but payment was delayed because of a lengthy dock strike and because of the outbreak of the war between India and Pakistan.

The plaintiffs contend that the defendants represented to them that the purchase of the plant would be consummated upon the successful completion of the Pakistan contract, and not merely upon Fiberglass's receipt of the contract. Moreover, they testified that Mr. Cohn represented to them, at the time they were considering the investment, that he intended to take the company "public" at \$10 a share in the near future. They testified they were not informed that the plant had been closed by Koppers and that Fiberglass would incur substantial "start-up" costs. Nor, they contended, had they been warned that the business was much more competitive than the "market" description in the summary prepared by Mr. Medney would lead one to believe, and that adequate bank financing for the venture had not been obtained. They were, they complained, given none of the history of the pipe plant under Koppers, information that, they assert, would have shown that the plant was unprofitable.

As noted, the defendants maintained that disclosure of the financial history under Koppers was of marginal relevance to the prospects of the proposed new company because of differences in overhead and in accounting tech-

niques. Further, Mr. Cohn denied ever making any statement regarding a certain date or price for taking Fiberglass "public". He said that though it was always his goal in such financings to take the company "public", the highly speculative nature of the investment precluded any representation respecting time or price. He testified that he made it a point to warn each offeree, in most instances on the telephone, that the investment was highly speculative and that the entire investment could be lost. And, on the question of start-up costs, he stated that such expenses that were incurred during the transition in ownership were to be expected. In any event, Mr. Medney testified that the plant purchased from Koppers was in fact closed from May to December of 1968, and that Mr. Cohn knew this.

Whatever their motivation, Miss Woolf and Mr. Milberg were induced to invest \$100,000 in the debentures, and, at their request, the company recorded half in the ownership of each. In fact, they represented five other investors in addition to themselves, individuals who were their friends or business associates. The debenture agreement which the plaintiffs signed when they paid for the debentures contained a clause that provided:

You [purchaser] represent and warrant that (i) you are acquiring the Debentures, and the shares of Common Stock issuable upon conversion of the Debentures, for your own account for investment and not with a view to or for sale in connection with any distribution of such Debentures or Common Stock, nor with any present intention of distributing or selling the Debentures or the shares of Common Stock of the Company which may be

received upon conversion of the Debentures, and (ii) no other person has any beneficial interest in, or right to acquire, the Debentures or the shares of Common Stock of the Company which may be received upon conversion of the Debentures, or any part thereof.

The plaintiffs contend that Mr. Cohn was aware of the participation of the five other investors in the \$100,000 purchase, that Miss Woolf discussed the matter with him, and that he himself provided her with a form of "investment letter" or "nominee letter" and suggested she use it. That form acknowledged the receipt of the sum the investor had paid Miss Woolf, promised to pay 6 percent annual interest on that sum "when collected from Fiberglass Resources, Inc.," and stated the understanding regarding the "loan":

As you know, I have invested \$50,000 in Fiberglass Resources, Inc. which is a restricted bond which has not been registered for sale to the public. These bonds were bought for investment only and not with a view to resale. When, as and if I am legally permitted to do so I shall deliver to you in payment of said loan an amount of said debentures or the shares into which they are convertible, the amount of which shall be equal to the amount of the loan which you made to me, which you agree to accept in full payment of the loan.

The maker of the loan signed a statement at the end of the "investment letter" saying that "I have read the above and agree with its contents," and returned a copy to Miss Woolf.

Mr. Cohn, on the other hand, denied any knowledge of the involvement of five investors in addition to Miss Woolf and Mr. Milberg, and stated that he never supplied Miss Woolf with the form of "investment letter."

Once the investment was made, and the plant acquired from Koppers, economic reality overtook Fiberglass. In addition to the dock strike and the war in Pakistan, the domestic demand for Fiberglass's products was not what had been anticipated, and by March of 1969 it was clear the company would have to obtain further bank credit to survive. The holders of the debentures, including the plaintiffs, were requested by Mr. Cohn, who at the time was also a director of Fiberglass, to convert their debentures into shares of common stock. This would, of course, improve the capital structure of the company from the point of view of the lender but, theoretically at least, weaken the interest of the former debenture holders. The plaintiffs testified that again Mr. Cohn made representations respecting an impending public offering of Fiberglass that would be facilitated by the change in capital structure, thereby inducing them to convert their debentures. Mr. Cohn denied making such statements.

Finally, the company was again seeking further credit from the Chemical Bank in August of 1971 when the plaintiffs sold their shares to Mr. Medney's father or to the corporation directly (the record is not clear on the point). Management had called a special meeting of shareholders, apparently to approve certain actions necessary to complete the loan transaction. The plaintiffs wrote a letter to Mr. Medney stating that in fact they were the nominees for twenty-two Florida residents and had been since the date of purchase. They further asserted that "[t]he rea-



son these stock were put in our names, rather than in the true owners' name was because Mr. Sidney D. Cohn so instructed us to avoid the possibility of this being a public offering," and that "upon calling the various investors and advising them of the impending stockholders' meeting they evidenced great discontent and informed us that they intended to communicate with the Chemical Bank directly." Mr. Medney, his father, and Fiberglass's counsel proceeded immediately to Miami to meet with the plaintiffs. In the course of the meeting, Mr. Medney's father urged them to hold their securities, but stated that he or the company would buy them out for \$35,000 if that was what they wanted. It was. Mr. Medney testified that at the time he thought that the representations in the plaintiffs' letter were true and that if they were communicated to Chemical Bank the loan would not be forthcoming. It should be noted that the representations, if communicated to the bank, might have impeded the loan negotiations whether or not they were true.

During the meeting, the plaintiffs were given copies of the company's audited financial reports from its inception and through June 30, 1971, and signed a statement to that effect. They then instituted the present suit against the defendants to recover the balance of the \$100,000 purchase price. Mr. Medney and Mr. Cohn testified that, at the time of trial, Fiberglass was in relatively good financial condition and that they anticipated a public offering of shares if that condition continued to improve.

The trial court found no violation of the securities acts in any of the defendants' actions. It found, however, that, even if the defendants had violated the law, the misrepresentations made by the plaintiffs regarding the num-

ber of beneficial owners of the shares, both in the debenture agreement and in the letter that precipitated the August 1971 meeting, put them in *pari delicto* with the defendants.

## II.

We turn first to the question whether the plaintiffs' conduct put them in *pari delicto* with the defendants, assuming the plaintiffs' allegations to be true. The origin of the doctrine of *in pari delicto* is described in *Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co.*, 1933, 290 U.S. 240, 54 S.Ct. 146, 78 L.Ed. 293. In that suit for patent infringement, it was argued that the prior misconduct of a patentee was unrelated to the question of the validity of a patent obtained later. The Court disagreed on the facts, but it did agree with the petitioners that not every transgression committed by a suitor in equity bars his suit under the doctrine of *in pari delicto*. Suit would be barred, in the discretion of the court, "only where some unconscionable act of one coming for relief has immediate and necessary relation to the equity that he seeks in respect of the matter in litigation." 290 U.S. at 245, 54 S.Ct. at 147.

Only recently, however, has the Court dealt with the interplay of common law equitable defenses and comprehensive federal regulatory schemes such as that embodied in the federal securities acts. In the antitrust area, the Court held in *Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons*, 1951, 340 U.S. 211, 71 S.Ct. 259, 95 L.Ed. 219, that proof that a private suitor had engaged in an unrelated conspiracy to commit some other antitrust violation would not bar recovery in his treble damage action. Later, in *Perma Life Mufflers Inc. v. International Parts Corp.*, 1968, 392 U.S. 134, 88 S.Ct. 1981, 20 L.Ed.2d 982, the Court said.

. . . we cannot accept the . . . idea that courts have power to undermine the antitrust acts by denying recovery to injured parties merely because they have participated to the extent of utilizing illegal arrangements formulated and carried out by others. . . . We therefore hold that the doctrine of *in pari delicto*, with its complex scope, contents, and effects, is not to be recognized as a defense to an antitrust action. . . . We need not decide, however, whether . . . truly complete involvement and participation in a monopolistic scheme could ever be a basis, wholly apart from the idea of *in pari delicto*, for barring a plaintiff's cause of action . . .

392 U.S. at 139-140, 88 S.Ct. at 1984. The Court in *Perma Life* was concerned lest a broad doctrine of judge-made law frustrate a strong congressional policy favoring the private antitrust suit as an important mode of enforcing the anti-trust laws.

Perhaps because a strong congressional policy favoring the private suitor asserting implied federal rights of action is less apparent under the securities laws than in other areas of statutory regulation, lower federal courts have permitted the *in pari delicto* defense in private actions under the securities laws. This Court expressly sanctioned the defense in *Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.*, 5 Cir. 1969, 412 F.2d 700. The Court characterized the plaintiff in that case as "in fact a dupe, but [one] who believes he is a tippee with a duty to disclose, and who endeavors to take wrongful advantage of his tip." 412 F.2d at 703. The plaintiff had been induced to buy Texstar stock on margin in the open market upon a tip (later shown to be false)

from the president of Texstar that there were certain merger negotiations and certain secret discoveries which, when made public, would spark a dramatic rise in the price of Texstar stock.<sup>4</sup> We said that in cases involving trading on market information, at least, the focal inquiry in deciding to allow the *in pari delicto* defense is: "which decision will have the better consequences in promoting the objective of the securities laws by increasing the protection to be afforded the investing public." 412 F.2d at 704.

[1] There is no doubt that private actions under the securities laws protect the investing public both by deterring future violations and by requiring the offenders to pay for past violations.<sup>5</sup> *Kuehnert* is consistent with the principle that the *in pari delicto* defense must not be used to frustrate the availability of the private suit as a means of enforcing the securities acts. This Court in *Kuehnert* felt that, on the facts in that case, permitting the *in pari delicto* defense against a plaintiff who was an active participant in the unlawful conduct would not frustrate the enforcement of the securities acts. The plaintiff there did not actually possess material inside information (the

<sup>4</sup>The leading case in the area of trading on market information is, of course, *S. E. C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.*, 2d Cir., 401 F.2d 833, rev'g and aff'g in part 258 F.Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y.1966), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976, 89 S.Ct. 1454, 22 L.Ed.2d 756 (1969). For a recent study of the problems involved in this area, see Fleischer, Mundheim, & Murphy, *An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information*, 121 U.Pa.L.Rev. 798 (1973), in which many of the leading cases are reviewed. The background of the Texas Gulf Sulphur case is reviewed in Patrick, *Perpetual Jeopardy: The Texas Gulf Sulphur Affair* (1972).

<sup>5</sup>It need hardly be added that the Securities Acts were not enacted only for the "long-term" or conservative investor. As the Second Circuit noted, "[t]he speculators and chartists of Wall and Bay Streets are also 'reasonable' investors entitled to the same legal protection afforded conservative traders." 401 F.2d 849.



Court did not consider the market impact of Texstar's president's statements, even though false, if they had been made public), and so could not be said to have withheld anything from those from whom he purchased the stock. As the Court saw it, the investing public was not affected, and so the case involved only a dispute between private individuals equally guilty of violating the law.

More recently, in *James v. DuBreuil*, 5 Cir. 1974, 500 F.2d 155, this Court further considered situations in which the *in pari delicto* defense might properly be applied to bar a private cause of action under the securities laws. The plaintiff there complained that the defendant had fraudulently induced him to sell to the defendant certain shares of stock in Inter National Bank of Miami. The transaction here had even less effect on the investing public at large than that in *Kuehnert*, since this was a face-to-face transaction. A merger had been announced between Inter National and another bank. The defendant represented to the plaintiff that if the plaintiff would sell him his shares, the defendant could obtain a substantially higher price for the shares by pooling them in an "organizers' trust" and then selling them when the merger was consummated. The defendant failed to inform the plaintiff that, if the merger were consummated, the plaintiff would be entitled to appraisal rights due dissenting shareholders under federal banking law, see 12 U.S.C. § 215a(b) — (d). In fact, no such "organizers' trust" existed. The plaintiff agreed to sell the shares with the understanding, reduced to writing, that he and the defendant would share equally in any profit realized on resale of the shares. Under S.E.C. Rule 133, then in force, the defendant was forbidden from making transactions in his company's stock during the period in which the merger negotiations were taking place.

The rule did not apply to options to buy entered into before the limitation period prescribed by the rule. The plaintiff agreed with the defendant to enter into an option agreement and to back-date it so that it would appear that several years had lapsed between the grant of the option and the merger. This they did. After the merger, the defendant declined to divide his profit with the plaintiff. This Court noted that the plaintiffs' participation in the unlawful activity was a *sine qua non* for the success of the defendant's scheme. The parties' falsification of the option agreement was accomplished through the active participation of both and, with the knowledge and intent of both, was designed to circumvent the prohibition of Rule 133. This Court, citing *Perma Life*, held that, on these facts, "the fault of the parties being clearly mutual, simultaneous, and relatively equal", the defense of *in pari delicto* therefore was available.

The case before us is distinguishable from both these recent cases and bears a significant resemblance to some cases in other circuits. For example, in *Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck*, 10 Cir. 1964, 331 F.2d 371, the issuer sought to bar a suit to recoup the purchase price paid for unregistered securities sold under misrepresentations in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e and 77l. The plaintiff had become so swept up in the promotional effort to sell the undivided interests in oil and gas leases involved that in addition to investing a substantial amount of money herself, she actively induced friends and acquaintances to do the same. The court did not think the case a proper one for the defense of *in pari delicto*. It noted that the plaintiff's relationship "as a pure investor became adulterated when she actively assisted in selling others but she at no time had the degree of culpability attributed to defend-

ants . . .” 331 F.2d at 373. The court did not speculate on what degree of involvement would be sufficient to permit the defense.

In *Katz v. Amos Treat & Co.*, 2d Cir. 1969, 411 F.2d 1046, 1049, the plaintiff was “a dentist by profession and an operator in securities by avocation.” The plaintiff had been induced to invest large amounts of money in the securities of a plastics coating company, securities that were soon to be registered and offered to the public for sale, he was told. He was encouraged to bring in his friends as investors before the stock was made available to the public and its price “zoomed.” No registration statement was ever filed, no stock was ever offered to the public, and the balance sheet of the plastics company went from bad to worse. In reversing the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint at the close of the plaintiff’s case, against four of the original defendants, the Second Circuit gave no indication that the plaintiff’s causes of action under § 12 of the 1933 Act and § 10 of the 1934 Act could be barred by his own unwitting participation in the scheme.

There was more evidence in the record in *Katz* of outrageous conduct on the part of the defendants than in the present case. In *Katz*, for example, we learn that prospective investors were invited to the plant where they were treated to an impressive display of activity, particularly in the shipping room for outgoing orders. While the present record contains its share of temporizing excuses for delay in “going public,” and reflects at least one visit to the Fiberglass plant that afforded some temporary reassurance to one disgruntled investor, the defendants’ conduct in *Katz* was worse. The degree of knowledge of par-

ticipation in the violations on the part of the plaintiffs seems roughly the same here and in *Katz*.

[2, 3] More generally, we think that the principles that have emerged already in this developing area make application of the *in pari delicto* defense inappropriate on the facts of this case. From *James v. Dubreuil* we have it that the fault of the parties must be “mutual, simultaneous, and relatively equal”, and the plaintiff must be an active, essential, and knowing participant in the unlawful activity. Moreover, because of the twofold purpose of the implied private rights of action that have grown up around the securities acts, deterrence of violations and compensation of those who have suffered pecuniary loss attributable to violations, the degree to which the defendant’s unlawful activity affects the investing public must be given substantial weight in determining whether to permit interposition of the *in pari delicto* defense. Thus, even in a case where the fault of the plaintiff and defendant were relatively equal, simultaneous and mutual, the court might still reject the defense if it appeared that the defendant’s unlawful activities were of a sort likely to have a substantial impact on the investing public, and the primary legal responsibility for and ability to control that impact is with the defendant.

[4] The district court rested its finding that the plaintiffs were *in pari delicto* upon two separate misrepresentations made in writing by the plaintiffs. The first was in the debenture agreement they signed upon consummating their purchase of the debentures, to the effect that they were holding for investment and not with a view to distribution and that there were no other beneficial owners. The second was in the August 1971 letter to Mr.



Medney stating that there were twenty-two other beneficial owners. From what we have said, it should be apparent that the latter misrepresentation could not in itself make the plaintiffs equally blameworthy with the defendants. It was wholly unrelated in time and in purpose from the alleged unlawful activity of the defendants that is the subject matter of the suit — the alleged misrepresentations and failures to disclose on the part of the defendants in connection with the distribution of Fiberglass debentures. It was calculated to raise the specter of a violation of the 1933 Act attributable to the presence of an excessive number of offerees in what might otherwise qualify as a private placement under § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, and was part of a strategy of self-help the plaintiffs resorted to in order to recoup their investment once it appeared that all was not well with Fiberglass. We do not condone it, but neither do we think it can be characterized as active, knowing, simultaneous and equal participation in the primary activity that is the subject matter of the suit.

The representations the plaintiffs made by signing the debenture agreement present a more difficult problem, since they were clearly simultaneous with the alleged transgressions of the defendants. In fact, the plaintiffs testified that they were following Mr. Cohn's instructions, which would make them active and knowing participants in a course of conduct designed to make the number of offerees of the debentures appear to be smaller than it actually was. At the time of the offering, the securities bar generally regarded it as a necessary but not sufficient condition for a private placement that the securities be offered to not more than twenty-five investors, although the S.E.C. had cautioned on several occasions that it did not regard the number of offerees as controlling. See, e. g., Gilligan,

Will & Co. v. S.E.C., 2d Cir. 1959, 267 F.2d 461, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896, 80 S.Ct. 200, 4 L.Ed.2d 152, Here the evidence on this point was conflicting. The trial court found that Mr. Cohn did not know that the plaintiffs represented other beneficial owners. Whether Mr. Cohn knew of the other beneficial owners or not has little or no bearing on the question of the availability of the *in pari delicto* defense here.

[5, 6] The availability of the defense in this case should, rather, turn on the impact the defendants' alleged violations might have on the investing public. This seems the rationale, though not explicitly stated, of cases such as *Can-Am* and *Katz*. Those cases, like the instant case, involved the distribution of unregistered securities by issuers who hoped their activities would fall within the § 4(2) exemption from registration under the 1933 Act. As we note in Part III, it is the responsibility of the issuer and its agent or underwriter seeking the advantages of the exemption from registration to see to it that all the requirements for the private placement exemption are met. Registration is the central mechanism the framers of the securities acts chose for the protection of investors. The § 4(2) exemption provided relief from the burden of registration for distributions of securities not involving "any public offering," but, in the absence, until recently, of any definitive rule by the S.E.C. on the availability of the exemption, it has been the task of the courts to attempt to set some intelligible limits upon it. Indeed, it is in this context that the private suit is particularly appropriate, because an issuer claiming the exemption does not file with the S.E.C. the detailed information required for registered securities and is not subject even to the scrutiny accorded these filings by the S.E.C. staff. The



S.E.C. has issued "no-action" letters at the request of issuers seeking the exemption, but it is not known what proportion of issuers seeking the exemption filed requests for letters, nor is it clear what proportion of the requests has been granted. In its statement accompanying the promulgation of new rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1975), the Commission indicated it would issue such letters in the future only infrequently and in the most compelling circumstances. See CCH Fed.Sec.L.Rep. ¶ 2850 (1975).

[7] Therefore, in many instances, particularly those involving relatively small distributions, the private suit is the only effective means of detecting and deterring wrongdoing on the part of issuers and their agents or underwriters who have not registered the securities being offered for sale. Accordingly, even though the plaintiffs here, as in *Can-Am* and *Katz*, had participated to some degree in facilitating the distribution by signing the debenture agreement, we hold that their conduct does not place them in *pari delicto* with the defendants, who, claiming the benefits of the § 4(2) exemption, have the legal duty to meet the qualifications for it.

### III.

[8] In bringing suit to recover the balance of the purchase price paid for the debentures, the plaintiffs were seeking a relatively simple form of relief, closely analogous to rescission, a recognized remedy under 10b-5. See e.g., *Stevens v. Vowell*, 10 Cir. 1965, 343 F.2d 374; *Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith*, 9 Cir. 1962, 312 F.2d 210. The unusual aspect here is that the plaintiffs recovered roughly 35 percent of the purchase price when they sold their shares back to the company or to Mr. Medney's father

(the record is unclear on the point) in 1971, three years after their purchase. This fact does not, in our view, alter their right to seek damages compatible with the rescission remedy; it does, however, raise the interesting question of the allocation of liability (if proved) between the issuer, Fiberglass, and its agents S. D. Cohn & Co. and Mr. Cohn. It is unnecessary for us to reach this question in light of the disposition we make of the remaining issues.

The difficult question this case presents — and, so far as our research shows, it is a novel one — is the extent to which rule 10b-5 provides a remedy to a purchaser of securities against the issuer or others involved in the distribution when the issuer and its agents fail to conduct the distribution in such a manner that it qualifies for the exemption from registration provided by § 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970). The plaintiffs' theory was not well articulated before the trial court. Indeed, the appellees complain that the appellants are shifting theories on appeal. Even if that were true, the arguments presented on appeal are implicit in the facts and must be considered by this Court. See, e.g., *Shumate & Co. v. National Assoc. of Sec. Dealers*, 5 Cir. 1975, 509 F.2d 147 and cases there cited. We think, however, that rule 10b-5 is broad enough to afford a remedy for the wrongdoing that is alleged here.

Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for any person by the use of any instrumentality of interstate commerce or a national securities exchange

(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,

(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,

in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

[9,10] The rule is broad enough to comprehend most cause of action for corporate mismanagement presently available chiefly under state business corporation and fiduciary law, and more beside. And, of course, federal courts would not be constrained by *Erie* from altering state law in the process to make it more congenial to the purposes of the federal regulatory statutes that spawned the rule.

A striking example of the trend is *Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.*, 2d Cir. 1970, 430 F.2d 355, rev'd & remanded for trial, 404 U.S. 6, 92 S.Ct. 165, 30 L.Ed.2d 128, a case involving a purchase of the shares of a subsidiary and subsequent payment for the shares by the purchasers of control by misappropriating bonds in the subsidiary's own portfolio. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized the case as a paradigm of corporate mismanagement under state law and saw no case under 10b-5. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the Supreme Court, disagreed: "The crux of the . . . case is that [the subsidiary being acquired] suffered an injury

as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as an investor." 404 U.S. at 1273, 92 S.Ct. at 169.<sup>9</sup>

The most recent word on the scope of rule 10b-5 from the Supreme Court came in *Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State of Utah v. United States*, 1972, 406 U.S. 128, 92 S.Ct. 1456, 31 L.Ed.2d 741. There, Indians had deposited in a bank shares of stock in a corporation formed to manage mineral rights underlying their reservation. The bank agreed to oversee transfers of the Indians' shares and ensure that they were properly made. On advice of certain of the bank's employees, some of the Indians approved transfer of their shares to whites at substantially less than their fair value. The Court held that the plaintiffs had made out a case under 10b-5 against the bank and its employees, and clarified the necessity of showing "reliance" in a non-disclosure case:

Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in the making of this decision.

406 U.S. at 153-54, 92 S.Ct. at 1472.

The case before us is relatively easy with respect to the applicability of 10b-5 because of the close nexus be-

<sup>9</sup>The requirement that the deceptive practice "touch" the sale or purchase of securities is, of course, an elastic one, and has been criticized on that account. See Note, the Controlling Influence Standard on Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 1007 (1973).



tween the alleged wrongs complained of and the fairness of the public and private securities markets. The keystone of the securities acts is "disclosure". Disclosure is a prime weapon in the arsenal Congress devised for the protection of investors. But the legislation demonstrates, in its methodology if not in an express statement of purpose, a close relationship with the trading mechanisms by which transactions in securities are carried out. Indeed, it might be possible to draw a workable line of demarcation between transactions covered both by 10b-5 and state law and those properly controlled only by the latter, by reference to the effect the transaction has on the securities markets. Misappropriation of some tangible assets of a closely held corporation by a dishonest accountant, because of its limited or perhaps nonexistent impact on the securities markets, might be relegated to the traditional state law of corporate mismanagement.

[11-14] A case such as the present one, on the other hand, is related to the fairness of the public and private securities markets in a double sense. First, it involves the representations incident to the creation and sale of equity securities in a new corporation, with the expectation that the shares will later be listed on a national securities exchange. Second, in addition to the truth or falsity of the representations as to the prospects of the firm, it involves the legality of the very procedure by which the securities were offered for sale, that is, whether the transaction qualified for the § 4(2) exemption. These two senses in which the public and private securities markets are involved are themselves related: one of the cardinal requirements for a § 4(2) exemption is that the investors involved have accurate information regarding the state of affairs in the corporation in which their investment is

solicited. To the extent it connotes a transaction that has no effect on the securities markets, the term of art "private placement" associated with the § 4(2) exemption is inaccurate. Although issues qualifying for the exemption are excused from relatively onerous and expensive registration requirements, there remains the same high duty toward prospective investors as in a public offering, of which more later. The magnitude of transactions invoking the exemption, both in terms of their number and the aggregate amount of capital involved, underscores the importance of this sort of transaction in the overall process of capital allocation in our economy. See, e. g., Bloomenthal & Wing, *Securities Law* § 4.05[1][a] (1973): "corporate private placements were approximately \$8.5 billion compared to registered corporate offerings which were only in the amount of \$6.5 billion in 1965." Under any view of how far 10b-5 should extend, the area of private offerings of securities under the exemption afforded by § 4(2) of the 1933 Act is so closely related to the fairness of the public and private securities markets and the allocation of investment capital that it must come within the scope of the rule. The fact that the plaintiffs sought relief under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act for alleged violations of the 1933 Act does not alter this result, for, as the Second Circuit has noted, these acts are to be construed as "a single comprehensive scheme of regulation" to avoid inconsistencies and to promote their broad remedial purposes. *Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc.*, 2d Cir. 1969, 418 F.2d 1276 (collecting authorities).

Saying that 10b-5 includes in its ambit alleged violations of the 1933 Act in the area of private offerings does not end our inquiry. We must now ask whether the plaintiffs made out a 10b-5 case that was much broader than



the trial court thought was actionable under the rule. The trial court apparently thought that the plaintiffs' case was founded only upon certain alleged specific misrepresentations and omissions, and he found against the plaintiffs on the specifics. For example, he found that Mr. Cohn had not stated a specific time and price for "going public"; that Mr. Cohn had not said the purchase of the plant would go forward on the completion of the Pakistan contract but rather on the award of the contract. Closer to the other end of the law-fact spectrum, he found that Mr. Cohn had imparted to Mr. Milberg "all the information on Fiberglass" that Mr. Cohn "believed to be true and accurate," and that Mr. Cohn's status throughout the transactions "was that of a broker-dealer, not an underwriter."

[15] We need not decide here the validity of the trial court's findings of fact regarding specific misrepresentations or omissions, except to note the sharp conflict in the testimony regarding virtually every one of them. For, although 10b-5 liability could have been predicated upon the specific misrepresentations and omissions, if proved, it is still open to the plaintiffs to prove a 10b-5 violation in this context based upon something broader. Assume that the defendants failed to qualify the sale of Fiberglass debentures as exempt from registration under § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, and that part of the failure was a lack of disclosure of information regarding the investment opportunity that registration would have revealed. Depending on the amount of information the defendants failed to disclose to offerees and its materiality to the transaction, we think there comes a point where the failure to disclose can be characterized as an "act, practice or course

of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit" upon the offerees, in violation of the third clause of the rule.<sup>10</sup>

The starting point in determining whether a transaction validly falls within the § 4(2) exemption in *S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co.*, 1953, 346 U.S. 119, 73 S.Ct. 981, 97 L.Ed. 1494.<sup>11</sup> In that case, the Court stated that the "imposition of the burden of proof on an issuer who would plead the exemption seems to us fair and reasonable." 346 U.S. at 126, 73 S.Ct. at 985. On the merits, the Court noted: "The natural way to interpret the private offering exemption is in light of the statutory purpose. Since ex-

<sup>10</sup>Of course, it is also possible that such a failure to disclose could violate the first or second clauses of the rule.

<sup>11</sup>The literature on the private offering exemption under Section 4(2) is extensive. In addition to the single-volume treatise, Goldberg, *Private Placements and Restricted Securities* (1972), useful general accounts may be found in Jennings & Marsh, *Securities Regulation* 424-42 (3d Ed. 1972); Bloomenthal & Wing, *Securities Law* §§ 1.01 et seq. (1973); Note, *Reforming the Initial Sale Requirements of the Private Placement Exemption*, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 403 (1972); Meer, *The Private Offering Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act—A Study in Administrative and Judicial Contradiction*, 20 S.W.L.J. 503 (1966); Steffen, *The Private Placement Exemption: What To Do About A Fortuitous Combination in Restraint Trade*, 30 U.Chi.L.Rev. 211 (1963); O'Boyle, *Problems of Private Placement from the Viewpoint of the Issuer*, Henkel, *The Investment Bankers Role in the Private Placement of Securities*, Levenson, *Investment Companies and the Private Placement of Securities*, Sommer, *Problems of Controlling Persons, Young, Brokers and Control Stock Problems*, all in *Practising Law Institute, First Annual Institute on Securities Regulation* (1970); Schneider, *Private Placements*, Caplan, *Blue Sky Problems in Private Placements*, both in *Practising Law Institute, Second Annual Institute on Securities Regulation* (1971); Note, *Resale of Restricted Securities Under SEC Rule 144*, 81 Yale L.J. 1574 (1972); Steffen, *Private Placement Should Be Registered*, 43 N.C.L. Rev. 58 (1965); Rediker, *The Fifth Circuit Cracks Down on Not-So-Private Offerings*, 25 Ala.L.Rev. 289 (1973); Sowards, *Private Placements and Secondary Transactions: The Wheat Report Proposals for Reform*, 1970 Duke L.J. 515.

empt transactions are those as to which 'there is no practical need for \* \* \* [the bill's] application,' the applicability of [§ 4(2)] should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected need the protection of the Act. An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction 'not involving any public offering.'" 346 U.S. at 124-25, 73 S.Ct. at 984. The Court's use of the term "class" is probably attributable to the distribution scheme involved in that case a program instituted by a large manufacturer of food products by which unregistered shares of its common stock were offered for investment to a wide range of its employees, living in "over fifty widely separated communities" and engaged in every position from "chow loading foreman" to "veterinarian." 346 U.S. at 121, 73 S.Ct. 981. As an example of an offering that might come within the § 4(2) exemption, the Court cited an offer "made to executive personnel who because of their position have access to the same kind of information that the act would make available in the form of a registration statement." 346 U.S. at 125-26, 73 S.Ct. at 985.

The Court refined its test still further:

[O]nce it is seen that the exemption question turns on the knowledge of the offerees, the insurer's motives, laudable though they may be, fade into irrelevance. The focus of inquiry should be on the need of the offerees for the protections afforded by registration. The employees here were not shown to have access to the kind of information which registration would disclose.

346 U.S. at 126-27, 73 S.Ct. at 985. Ralston Purina was the Court's latest treatment of the private offering problem.

That problem has often been before the other courts since Ralston Purina, however, and has engendered two important opinions in this Court. In *Hill York Corp. v. American Int. Franchises, Inc.*, 5 Cir. 1971, 448 F.2d 680, this Court said that the availability of the exemption is peculiarly a question of fact dependent upon the circumstances of each case. The Court noted that § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970), made it unlawful to use an instrumentality of interstate commerce to sell or purchase a security for which no registration statement is in effect, and that § 12 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970), makes any person who offers or sells a security in violation of § 5 liable to his purchaser in a suit to recover the consideration paid. The Court then proceeded to consider "specific factors" relevant to whether the transaction qualifies for the exemption. We said that we should consider "the number of offerees and their relationship to each other and to the issuer", "the number of units [of the security] offered", "the size of offering" and "the manner of offering". 448 F.2d at 688-89.

We approved the trial court's jury charge "that every offeree had to have information equivalent to that which a registration statement would disclose". 448 F.2d at 689. We rejected the contention of the defendants in *Hill York* that a high degree of business or legal sophistication on the part of the offerees would be enough to establish the exemption. The offerees were lawyers and businessmen, for the most part, and we observed: "[o]bviously if the [offerees] did not possess the information requisite for a



registration statement, they could not bring their sophisticated knowledge of business affairs to bear in deciding whether or not to invest". 448 F.2d at 690. Moreover, we said "[t]he [offerees] do not have to prove that they could not have discovered the falsity upon reasonable investigation. . . . To put it simply, the availability of information elsewhere does not excuse misleading or incomplete statements". 448 F.2d at 696.<sup>12</sup>

The second important case was *S.E.C. v. Continental Tobacco Co.*, 5 Cir. 1972, 463 F.2d 137. In that case, the S.E.C. sued for injunctive relief against Continental with respect to an offering of its securities it claimed was exempt under § 4(2). Continental was incorporated to manufacture low-tar, low-nicotine cigarettes. The challenged offering involved presentations to prospective investors that were short on the kind of information registration would have revealed about the issuer, but that heavily emphasized films extolling the virtues of its cigarettes, including one that played upon the nondeleterious effects, relative to competing brands, that smoking its product had upon mice. Interestingly, a number of members of the medical and health professions were recruited as investors in this manner.

This Court in *Continental* began its analysis with the holdings of *Hill York*. We refined the tests established in

<sup>12</sup>This statement regarding the duty of an offeree to investigate should be compared with the Supreme Court's holding that, in an action predicated on Rule 10b-5, and involving failure to disclose material information, no specific showing of reliance on the part of the plaintiffs need be demonstrated, and that reliance would be assumed if the information withheld would have been regarded by an ordinary investor as important in the making of his investment decision. *Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State of Utah v. United States*, 1972, 406 U.S. 128, 92 S.Ct. 1456, 31 L.Ed.2d 741.

*Hill York* by focusing upon the information about Continental that each of the offerees possessed. "None of the purchasers had any actual opportunity to inspect Continental's records or to verify for themselves statements made to them as inducements for the purchases. Some of the purchasers had never met any officers of the company prior to acquiring the stock." 463 F.2d at 158. We disagreed with the district court that, because the offerees who purchased signed "investment letters" acknowledging receipt of a "prospectus" and unaudited financial statements, they should be held to have had access to all the information registration would have afforded. 463 F.2d at 160. However useful such statements might be as precautions, they cannot be in themselves, a basis for exemption.

Indeed, this Court went further in *Continental*. It agreed with the S.E.C.'s position that even if the prospectus that was sent to the purchasers contained all the information registration would disclose, that fact alone would not justify the exemption. We said: "Continental did not affirmatively prove that all offerees of its securities had received both written and oral information concerning Continental, that all offerees of its securities had access to any additional information which they might have required or requested, and that all offerees of its securities had personal contacts with the officers of Continental." 463 F.2d at 160.

This portion of the opinion was subjected to much criticism. See, e.g., Goldberg, *Private Placements and Restricted Securities* § 2.16[a] at 2-139; Kripke, "Wrap-up," *Revolution in Securities Regulation*, 29 Bus.Law. (Special Issues) 185, 187 (1973). The gist of the criticism has been



that Continental virtually requires that all offerees have "insider" status, if a transaction is to qualify as exempt under § 4(2). We think these fears are unfounded. The quoted language must be read in conjunction with the balance of the opinion, in which we noted that, although the record reflected that there were at least 38 offerees, 35 of whom bought stock, Continental failed to sustain its burden of proving that there were not more than the 38 offerees revealed in the evidence adduced by the S.E.C. In other words, even assuming that those investors who received the prospectus had received all the information registration would have disclosed, Continental's proof respecting the number of offerees and their relation to it was inadequate.

[16, 17] We should also note in this context that there is an important distinction between completing the registration process and merely making available to offerees all the information that registration would have disclosed. This distinction itself justifies our conclusion in Continental that mere disclosure of what registration would have revealed does not, without more, establish a § 4(2) exemption. Registration of securities with the S.E.C. is not a mechanistic, ministerial function, either on the part of the issuer or the S.E.C. The filings are subject to the scrutiny of the S.E.C. staff, which is empowered to take a variety of corrective measures against the issuer if the disclosure is incomplete or otherwise inadequate, and the Commission may seek disciplinary action against broker-dealers, civil relief and criminal sanctions as well. See generally Bloomenthal & Wing, Securities Law §§ 8.01

et seq. In a private offering, this scrutiny is not present,<sup>13</sup> and so we regard the imposition on issuers and their agents claiming the exemption of requirements, in addition to disclosure of what registration would have revealed, to be appropriate.

The additional limitations placed upon such offerings limit the number of people affected. Moreover, particularly since the S.E.C.'s adoption of Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1975),<sup>14</sup> and its introduction of the requirement, in cer-

<sup>13</sup>As we noted in Part II of this opinion, the S.E.C. in the past has issued "no-action" letters at the request of issuers seeking the § 4(2) exemption. It is not known what proportion of issuers seek such no-action letters, nor is it known what proportion of those requests has been granted by the S.E.C. In any event, the S.E.C. noted, in its statement accompanying the promulgation of new Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1975), that in the future, such no-action letters would be issued infrequently and only "in the most compelling circumstances." See 1 CCH Fed.Sec.L.Rep. ¶ 2850 (1975).

<sup>14</sup>New Rule 146 is lengthy, and has been usefully summarized as follows in Alberg & Lybecker, New S.E.C. Rules 146 and 147: The Non-Public and Intrastate Offering Exemptions from Registration for the Sale of Securities, 74 Colum.L.Rev. 622, 633-31 (1974):

(1) The issuer or any person acting on its behalf shall neither offer nor sell the securities by means of any form of general solicitation or advertising, including advertisements, seminars, or meetings, or any letter or other written communications, except in cases where all those invited to and attending meetings and all those receiving written communications satisfy the conditions of Paragraph (2) below.

(2) The issuer shall have reasonable grounds to believe and shall believe:

(a) immediately prior to making any offer, either: (i) that the offeree has "such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment," or (ii) that the offeree is a person who is able to bear the economic risk of the investment"; and

(b) immediately prior to making any sale, after making reasonable inquiry, either: (i) that the offeree has such knowl-

(Footnote Continued on Next Page)

tain circumstances, that the issuer ascertain that the prospective investor is capable of bearing the economic risk of the investment, the impact upon individual investors should the venture fail is diminished. Rule 146 imposes the additional requirement that, before an issuer may sell an unregistered security under its provisions, he must have

*(Footnote Continued from Preceding Page)*

edge and experience, or (ii) that the offeree and his offeree representative(s) together have such knowledge and experience and that the offeree is able to bear the economic risk of the investment.

(3) Each offeree shall either:

(a) have access to the same kind of information that is required by Schedule A of the 1933 Act (including financial statements, description of business, etc.); or

(b) have furnished to him or his offeree representatives the same kind of information that is required by such Schedule A.

(4) Each offeree or his representative shall have the opportunity to obtain any additional information necessary to verify the accuracy of any such information and to ask questions and receive answers from the issuer.

(5) Each offeree shall be informed in writing by the issuer that he must continue to bear the economic risk of the investment for an indefinite time and that the securities cannot be sold unless they are subsequently registered or an exemption is available.

(6) There shall be no more than thirty-five persons who purchase securities of the issuer of the same or similar class in any offering pursuant to the Rule.

(7) The issuer shall exercise reasonable care to assure that the persons purchasing the securities from the issuer are not underwriters, including:

(a) making a reasonable inquiry to determine if the purchaser is purchasing for his own account;

(b) placing a legend on the certificate stating that the securities have not been registered and setting forth or referring to the restrictions on transferability;

(c) placing stop-transfer instructions against the shares on the books of the issuer and with the transfer agent; and

(d) obtaining from the purchaser a written agreement that the securities will not be sold without registration or under an exemption.

*(Footnote Continued on Next Page)*

reasonable grounds to believe that the investor, either on his own or with the aid of an "investment advisor", be "sophisticated", that is that he be "capable of evaluating the merits and risk of the prospective investment." This new requirement carries the analysis of Hill York and similar cases one step further. In Hill York, we said that the "sophistication" of the offerees was not enough alone

*(Footnote Continued from Preceding Page)*

The new rule does not purport to be an exclusive definition of those offerings that qualify for the § 4(2) exemption. The anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Acts, of course, apply to offerings whether or not they meet the requirements of Rule 146. Some commentators viewed the promulgation of Rule 146 as a response on the part of the S.E.C. to the holdings of this Court in the Hill York and Continental cases. See, e. g., Arthur, Rule 146 Under the Securities Act of 1933: A Significant Codification, 56 Chicago B.Rec. 91 (1974). Some members of the financial community apparently read the Continental case in particular to require that offerees have the status of "insiders" in order for the offering to qualify under § 4(2). The concern was particularly acute in the case of large institutional investors, such as banks and insurance companies, which were prohibited by state and federal law from occupying that status with respect to concerns in which they had made large investments. As we have noted, we do not read the Continental case this broadly.

The new rule provides that the offeree must either have access to the information that registration would have disclosed, or that the issuer must furnish him or his representative that information. The new rule is more restrictive than the cases in this Circuit in that it requires that the offeree either be sophisticated or advised by an offeree representative who is, in addition to the requirement that offerees receive or have access to information that registration would disclose. Moreover, the requirement that the offerees be able to bear the economic risk of the investment is one that our cases never dealt with. In addition to the vagueness of this requirement, it is remarkable that no consideration is given to the actual risk of the investment opportunity. Presumably this element in the investment decision is subsumed in the rules disclosure requirements; a sophisticated and well-heeled investor should, presumably, be able to assess the risk of the investment himself. It should be noted that the new Rule 146 does not require the issuer to report any information regarding the offer sought to be exempted under § 4(2) to the S.E.C.

For a recent explication of new rule 146, see Kinderman, The Private Offering Exemption: An Examination of its Availability Under and Outside Rule 146, 30 Bus.Law 921 (1975).



to qualify; rule 146 says that "sophistication" is required but not enough. Of course, the new rule does not purport to be an exclusive definition of the circumstances under which the exemption is available—indeed, it disclaims any such intent. It is probable, however, that practitioners will be unwilling to stray from the safe harbor the rule apparently affords, and it does provide a useful frame of reference to an appellate court in assessing the validity of § 4(2) exemptions claimed, like this one, prior to its effective date.

[18] In any event, we cannot agree with those critics who read the Continental case to require that the offerees have "insider" status.<sup>15</sup> We read it as requiring that there be disclosure of the information registration would have revealed to each offeree, with the caveat that such disclosure is not in itself sufficient to qualify for the exemption. This is the main refinement Continental added to the test in Hill York.

<sup>15</sup>Compare the comments of Commissioner Owens on the brief filed by the S.E.C. staff in the Continental case:

Some commentators have suggested (and I believe there is merit in their suggestions) that this language [in the S.E.C. brief] could be read to mean that a permissible private placee must have a position with the company similar to that of an insider in the 10b-5 sense. If such an interpretation were to prevail, it could lead to such a narrowing of the exemption that even an institutional investor could not qualify. This is certainly not a conclusion which I can support; in fact, I do not believe it was intended by the Commission. My interpretation of the Commission's position in this case is that (1) the offerees must be shown to have access to material information concerning the issuer and (2) the access criteria cannot be met by merely providing, gratuitously, a promotional prospectus purporting to afford instant access and by having each offeree and purchaser sign a letter saying he has received and read such document.

Address by Commissioner Hugh F. Owens before the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., reported in 152 BNA Sec.Reg. & L.Rep. at G-2 (May 17, 1972).

[19, 20] Applying this test, then, to the record in this case, we have serious doubt that Fiberglass' sale of debentures qualified as exempt under § 4(2). As we indicated in Continental, boilerplate clauses in documents signed by purchasers stating that they have received full disclosure, or all the disclosure they desire, do not establish an exemption, and in the present case this applies both to the clauses in the "debenture agreement" the plaintiffs signed and the statement they signed upon selling their shares either to Mr. Medney or Fiberglass. Similarly, the trial court's finding that Mr. Cohn told Mr. Milberg all the information he had obtained about Fiberglass he believed to be true is only the beginning of the inquiry, not its conclusion. Candor is the first thing required of an agent of an issuer, but not the only thing. The issuer and its agents in a private placement must afford each offeree with the information registration would have afforded a prospective investor in a public offering. The parties' debate in the briefs over the status of S. D. Cohn & Co. and Mr. Cohn as "underwriters" misses the point. Section 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970), makes it unlawful for any person to sell unregistered securities. Section 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970) exempts from this prohibition "transactions of any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." There can be no question that S. D. Cohn & Co. and Mr. Cohn were "dealers" within the meaning of § 2(12), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(12) (1970):

The term "dealer" means any person who engages either for all or part of his time, directly or indirectly, as agent, broker, or principal, in the business of offering, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another person.



S. D. Cohn & Co. and Mr. Cohn are therefore prohibited from selling unregistered securities unless the offering is exempt under § 4(2).

Moreover, they would be underwriters under § 2(11), if they offered or sold for an issuer (Fiberglass) in connection with the distribution of any security. Since the S.E.C. has always taken the position that "distribution" in this context means a public offering, their status under § 2(11) again turns on whether the offering was exempt under § 4(2). See, e.g., I L. Moss, *Securities Regulation* 551 (2d ed. 1961). The record indicates that they were substantial shareholders in Fiberglass, and suggests that for some purposes, at least, they were under the duties imposed upon the issuer because of their possible status as "control persons." Cf. Sommer, *Problems of Controlling Persons*, Practising Law Institute, First Annual Institute on Securities Regulation 105 (1970). We need not pursue this line of inquiry, however, for in our view of the case the label attached to them is of secondary importance. What matters more here is whether they violated § 5 of the 1933 Act by selling unregistered securities, and this in turn depends upon whether they and Fiberglass, the issuer, had a valid claim to the § 4(2) exemption.

The record is not clear as to what information was disclosed to whom at what time. It does not appear that S. D. Cohn & Co.'s 7½ percent commission was disclosed until the delivery of the debenture agreement for signature, and our examination of the record does not reveal when, if ever, the additional 10% interest in the debentures was disclosed. We cannot tell whether the plan of distribution was revealed to the plaintiffs, or whether they were fully advised of the uses to which the proceeds of the

debentures were to be put. It is reasonably clear that they did not receive financial statements or other information bearing on the prior performance of the predecessor corporation as they would have had the debentures been registered. See 15 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1975). Other than the information contained in the summary, which the trial court found the defendants did not send to the plaintiffs, the record does not show whether there was disclosure of the physical facilities and their suitability for the proposed enterprise.

The record does not show whether there was disclosure of the capital structure of the company, including dividend rights, pre-emptive rights, and the like—important information here, because the debentures were convertible. The record does not show whether the names and backgrounds of the directors and officers, their compensation, or their options to purchase securities were revealed. We cannot tell whether there was disclosure of persons owning more than 10 percent of the issuer's stock. In short, we cannot tell from the record whether many items of information that registration would have made available to prospective investors were disclosed to the plaintiffs here. Moreover, from his own testimony, it appears that Mr. Cohn never had direct communications with Miss Woolf (although she disputes this with regard to certain aspects of the transaction). This impersonal manner of offering itself calls into question the validity of the claimed exemption. In this connection it is significant that new rule 146 places upon the issuer or his agent duty to exercise reasonable care to ascertain that the offeree is not or will not become an "underwriter" under § 2(11) and that the offeree meets the "sophistication" and "risk-bearing" requirements of the rule. The absence of any personal contact with the

issuer or its agents here would tend to indicate a manner of offering more public than private, using the Hill York formulation. We cannot tell how many other offerees there were in this transaction.

[21, 22] On the present record, we cannot say whether the transaction here qualified as a private offering under § 4(2) of the 1933 Act. We have indicated some of the inadequacies in the record, and, on remand, the burden is on the defendants to establish the availability of the exemption. The unusual aspect of this case, however, is that even if the defendants should fail to demonstrate the availability of the exemption, the plaintiffs may fail to recover the balance of the purchase price. For the plaintiffs did not bring suit under § 12 of the 1933 Act but rather under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule 10b-5. It follows that they must show that the omissions or misrepresentations of information that make the § 4(2) exemption unavailable to the defendants, in their cumulative effect, were such that a reasonable investor, had the information registration would have afforded been available, might have considered them important in the making of his investment decision. They need not show that they themselves would have relied on the information the defendants failed to disclose. *Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State of Utah v. United States*, 1972, 406 U.S. 128, 92 S.Ct. 1456, 31 L.Ed.2d 741; cf. Note, *The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5*, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 584. Failure to disclose material information that would have been disclosed by registration and failure to qualify for the § 4(2) exemption are not the same thing, and it may develop on remand that the exemption is unavailable even though the defendants disclosed to the plaintiffs all the information registration would have revealed.

The judgment of the district court is therefore vacated, and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Vacated and remanded.

App. 54

**APPENDIX D**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

No. 71-1738-Civ-NCR

SHIRLEY WOOLF and ROBERT MILBERG  
Plaintiffs

vs.

S. D. COHN & COMPANY and SIDNEY D. COHN  
Defendants  
Third Party Plaintiffs

**ORDER**

FILED APR 25 1974

THIS CAUSE is before the court on plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment.

Upon consideration of the record in this cause, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the court's opinion denying recovery to the plaintiffs was based upon several grounds which would remain unaffected regardless of the truth or falsity of the statements concerning purchase of the factory. For this reason, the court feels it is not necessary to explore plaintiffs' allegations further and the motion is denied. [The District Court has the authority to deny a Rule 60 Motion. Ferrell v. Trailmobile, 233 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1955)].

DONE AND ORDERED this 25th day of April, 1975.

/s/ Norman C. Roettger Jr.,  
United States District Judge

App. 55

**APPENDIX E**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

No. 71-1738-Civ-NCR

SHIRLEY WOOLF and ROBERT MILBERG  
Plaintiffs

vs.

S. D. COHN & COMPANY and SIDNEY D. COHN  
Defendants  
Third Party Plaintiffs

**ORDER**

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing.

Upon consideration of the record in this cause, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that said Motions are hereby denied.

DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of October, 1973.

NORMAN C. ROETTGER, JR.  
United States District Judge



**APPENDIX F**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

\_\_\_\_\_  
No. 71-1738-Civ-NCR  
\_\_\_\_\_

SHIRLEY WOOLF and ROBERT MILBERG  
Plaintiffs

vs.

S. D. COHN & COMPANY and SIDNEY D. COHN  
Defendants  
Third Party Plaintiffs

**FINAL JUDGMENT**

THIS CAUSE having come before the Court for trial and the Court having heard the evidence and argument of counsel, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment for the defendant is hereby entered and the Plaintiff shall recover nothing by this action. It is

FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the counterclaimants having introduced no evidence of damage in support of their counterclaim Judgment is entered for the counderdefendants. It is

FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that since the Defendants are not liable to the Plaintiffs the Third Party Complaint is rendered moot.

DONE AND ORDERED this 14 day of September, 1973.

NORMAN C. ROETTGER, JR.

\_\_\_\_\_  
United States District Judge

**APPENDIX G**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

\_\_\_\_\_  
No. 71-1738-Civ-NCR  
\_\_\_\_\_

SHIRLEY WOOLF and ROBERT MILBERG  
Plaintiffs

vs.

S. D. COHN & COMPANY and SIDNEY D. COHN  
Defendants  
Third Party Plaintiffs

**FINDINGS OF FACT AND  
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

Plaintiffs in this action sought to recover damages for violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the purchase or sale of securities. The Defendants filed a Third Party Complaint for indemnification against Fiberglass Resources Corporation. This Court finds in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiffs, and makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the evidence presented by the parties at a non-jury trial on January 8, 1973.

**FINDINGS OF FACT**

1. Sidney D. Cohn, the individual Defendant in this case, is a general partner in S. D. Cohn & Co., also a Defendant, and his status in the relevant transactions was that of a broker-dealer, not an underwriter.

2. S. D. Cohn & Co. is a partnership registered as a broker-dealer in securities, pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

3. Mr. Cohn first became aware of Fiberglass Resources Corporation through Jonas Medney who informed Mr. Cohn in 1968 of the opportunity for the new company to purchase the assets of the Lamtex division of Koppers Company, Inc.

4. Jonas Medney, the President of Fiberglass Resources Corporation, was President of Lamtex Industries of Koppers from March 1965 to February 1968 and had been with Lamtex since 1955.

5. The purchase price of the Lamtex operation was \$650,000.

6. The operating capital required by Fiberglass Resources Corporation in the purchase of the Lamtex operation was \$600,000.

7. To raise the needed operating capital, the new company authorized the issue of \$600,000 principal amount of its 6¼% convertible debentures. S. D. Cohn & Co. was employed by Fiberglass Resources Corporation to facilitate the private offering of the debentures, and in compensation for such services, S. D. Cohn & Co. would receive a brokerage commission of 7½% of the principal amount of the debentures sold as per paragraph ten of the Debenture Agreements.

8. Having been familiar with Mr. Medney's highly capable management of the Lamtex division while its

president, the Defendant, Sidney Cohn, was convinced that the prospects for Fiberglass Resources Corporation, with Mr. Medney at its helm, were bright, and investment in the new company was desirable.

9. Though the future of any new company was uncertain, Mr. Cohn believed that the purchase of Fiberglass debentures would be a good investment for a speculator in stocks.

10. While purchasing Fiberglass debentures on behalf of S. D. Cohn & Co., Mr. Cohn did notify the Plaintiff, Robert Milberg, of the opportunity to purchase such debentures and acquainted Mr. Milberg with all the information on Fiberglass Resources Corporation that he had obtained from conversations with Medney and which Mr. Cohn believed to be true and accurate. However, Mr. Cohn never delivered a "summary" on Fiberglass to Mr. Milberg or anyone else.

11. Mr. Milberg then conveyed the investment opportunity to the other Plaintiff, Shirley Woolf.

12. On October 18, 1968, the Plaintiffs transmitted to the Defendants the sum of \$50,000 each for the purchase of 6¼% convertible subordinate debentures of Fiberglass Resources Corporation.

13. Prior to October, 1968, Mr. Milberg had extensive, first-hand knowledge of the investment business. From 1952 to 1960, he worked for Bache & Co., members of the New York Stock Exchange, as a salesman, account executive, and resident manager of the Miami office. Following his affiliation with Bache & Co., Mr. Milberg

became a salesman for International Equities, an over-the-counter firm. In the mid-1960's, Mr. Milberg was employed by Herzfeld & Stern and Hentz & Company.

14. Mr. Milberg was employed by the Defendant, S. D. Cohn & Co., from March 1969 to December 1970 as manager of the Miami office.

15. Prior to October 1968, Miss Woolf had made substantial investments in the stock market through the Defendants in the amounts of \$200,000, \$150,000 and \$100,000. Miss Woolf had known Mr. Milberg for a considerable length of time, and Mr. Milberg would chart stocks for Miss Woolf and her investment partner, Harold Vineberg, in return for fifteen percent of the profits made on the stocks charted. Miss Woolf, with Mr. Vineberg, traded very heavily in many brokerage houses, not only S. D. Cohn & Co.

16. Miss Woolf has been a practising lawyer in Florida for some twenty-eight years after graduation from St. John Law School in Brooklyn, New York. She is a current member of the New York and Florida Bars. A significant portion of her practise entails commercial law, and among her clients was a New York finance company.

17. At the time of the purchase by the Plaintiffs of the Fiberglass debentures, Mr. Milberg possessed prior knowledge of the Lamtex operation of Koppers Company, which knowledge he had obtained from his experience in the stock market.

18. The Plaintiffs purchased the Fiberglass debentures based on their own knowledge and experience in the

stock market and upon the opinion of Sidney Cohn that Fiberglass Resources Corporation was an appealing investment, mainly due to Mr. Cohn's high regard for Jonas Medney.

19. A "summary" published by Fiberglass Resources Corporation, which was not a prospectus and was not intended for public distribution, did not contain any misrepresentations of material fact nor any omissions of material fact. At the time the summary was made, the projections and forecasts of the future prospects of Fiberglass Resources Corporation had a reasonable basis in fact and in method of preparation. If anything, the summary leaned toward conservatism. Milberg could not indicate any false statements in this summary other than two which became false in light of subsequent events. Plaintiffs presented no other evidence that the summary was false when made.

20. As a condition of Fiberglass Resources Corporation purchasing the Lamtex plant, it was essential that Fiberglass obtain a well-casing contract that Lamtex had with the Pakistan government in the sum of \$1,500,000. In September 1968, Fiberglass Resources Corporation did receive the Pakistan contract, thus opening the door for the purchase of the Lamtex plant. It was reasonably expected that the Pakistan job would benefit Fiberglass Resources Corporation in the last part of 1968 to the extent of \$225,000 in gross profits and net after taxes of \$100,000.

21. Subsequent to the procurement of the Pakistan contract, Fiberglass Resources Corporation was unexpectedly faced with the outbreak of the India-Pakistan



war and an extensive dock strike. As a result of such unforeseeable developments, the financial projections and forecasts contained in the summary were proven wrong, though the projections and forecasts were reasonably believed by Jonas Medney to be true and accurate when made. The Plaintiffs totally failed to prove the projections and forecasts were false when made.

22. At the present time, Fiberglass Resources Corporation is a profitable, going business, though it did need additional financing in 1969 due to the effects of the Pakistan conflict and the dock strike.

23. In composing the summary, Mr. Medney fully expected Fiberglass Resources Corporation to be self-generating and profitable on the basis of the situation as it existed at the time (prior to the Pakistan war and the dock strike,) provided \$600,000 in seed money and suitable bank credit were obtained.

24. Prior to the purchase of the Fiberglass debentures by Mr. Milberg and Miss Woolf, Mr. Cohn did inform them that Fiberglass Resources Corporation could be expected to go public at the proper time when conditions were right; however, Mr. Cohn neither stated that Fiberglass stock would be taken public at \$10 per share or any other price nor that Fiberglass would then be taken public within a specified period of time. The decision of Fiberglass Resources Corporation to go public did not rest with Mr. Cohn, but rather with the company's board of directors and management.

25. Sidney Cohn was a director of Fiberglass Resources Corporation, as he told Miss Woolf and Mr. Milberg he would be.

26. Mr. Cohn never told Miss Woolf and Mr. Milberg prior to or contemporaneous with the conversion that Fiberglass Resources Corporation had backlog orders amounting to \$1,500,000.

27. The holders of Fiberglass debentures were requested by the company to convert their debentures into common stocks to enable the company to obtain additional financing necessitated by the effects of the Pakistan war and dock strikes.

28. On or about March 1, 1969, the Plaintiffs, Miss Woolf and Mr. Milberg, converted their debentures into 33,322 shares of common stock of Fiberglass Resources Corporation.

29. Subsequent to the conversion of the debentures, Mr. Milberg visited the Fiberglass plant in the summer of 1969. Mr. Milberg met with Jonas Medney at the plant and inquired about the general condition of the company and was satisfied when he left.

30. In addition to the plant visit, Mr. Milberg had a substantial number of telephone conversations with Mr. Medney, at which times Mr. Milberg had complete access to all information regarding the financial condition of Fiberglass Resources Corporation. Additionally, Miss Woolf received, at the very least, the June 1969 and September 1969 financial statements of Fiberglass Resources Corporation.

31. By letter of August 4, 1971, the Plaintiffs, Shirley Woolf and Robert Milberg, represented to Jonas Medney of Fiberglass Resources Corporation that although

16,666 shares of Fiberglass stock had been registered in each of their names, Miss Woolf and Mr. Milberg, were "in actuality, the nominees since the date of purchase for 22 Florida residents." The letter further represented that the various investors "evidenced great discontent" and "intended to communicate with the Chemical Bank directly." The Plaintiffs openly admitted that the representations were false when written, and such misrepresentations were designed to get action from Fiberglass Resources Corporation. The significance of the falsehood regarding twenty-two Florida purchasers was that with twenty-two Florida purchasers rather than just the two Plaintiffs, the debenture offering by Fiberglass Resources Corporation could be in violation of the federal securities law requiring registration of public offerings since the number of purchasers exceeds the magic number of twenty-five which is one factor separating private from public offerings. Miss Woolf and Mr. Milberg were well-aware of the implications of twenty-two purchasers. Mr. Milberg testified at trial that at the time the August 4th letter was written, he knew the "twenty-two purchasers" were a violation of the law. If the Chemical Bank discovered that Fiberglass Resources Corporation had possibly violated the securities laws with an unregistered public offering as the August 4th letter intimated, there would be absolutely no chance for Fiberglass Resources Corporation to obtain a vital loan it had been seeking from the Chemical Bank.

32. In direct reliance upon the misrepresentations of Miss Woolf and Mr. Milberg contained in the August 4, 1971 letter to Fiberglass Resources Corporation and without ever being informed that the misrepresentations were just that, Fiberglass Resources Corporation purchased the 33,332 shares of Fiberglass stock registered

in the Plaintiffs' names for \$35,000 on August 16, 1971. The misrepresentations of twenty-two Florida purchasers and direct communication with the Chemical Bank left Fiberglass Resources Corporation with no alternative but to purchase the Plaintiffs' stock. Fiberglass evidently felt the loan from Chemical Bank had to be protected. Mr. Medney's father had told Plaintiffs they would be foolish to sell but he was willing to buy their stock.

33. The release of August 16, 1971 executed by Miss Woolf and Mr. Milberg in favor of Fiberglass Resources Corporation upon re-purchase of the 33,332 shares by the latter stated that "the sellers (Plaintiffs) have received full financial data concerning the Company from the inception of the Company until and including the year ended June 30, 1971."

34. The actual number of participants in the purchase of \$100,000 worth of Fiberglass debentures in the Plaintiffs' names was neither twenty-two nor two, but instead seven. While the number of investors can be discerned, the proportionate interest of each investor in the total investment is not so clear, since the breakdown of interests was never reduced to writing. It would serve little function for the Court to attempt to analyze the confusion in the testimony about which Plaintiffs — and other non-plaintiff participants — owned what interest.

35. In light of the existence of seven joint investors in the purchase of Fiberglass debentures in the Plaintiffs' names, the Plaintiffs, Miss Woolf and Mr. Milberg, made a misrepresentation of a material fact in the Debenture Agreement executed between Fiberglass Resources Corporation and themselves. In the Debenture Agreement signed



by Miss Woolf and Mr. Milberg as purchasers, Miss Woolf and Mr. Milberg represented and warranted that they were acquiring the Debentures for their own account for investment only and not with a view to distribution, and that "no other person has any beneficial interest in, or right to acquire, the Debentures." At the time Miss Woolf and Mr. Milberg signed the Debenture Agreement, there were five other investors with beneficial interests in the debentures. In reliance on the representations of Miss Woolf and Mr. Milberg that there were no other beneficial interests, Fiberglass Resources Corporation sold debentures to them.

36. The Defendant, Sidney Cohn, did not know that there were other investors involved in the Plaintiffs' purchase of Fiberglass debentures.

37. Miss Woolf and Mr. Milberg brought suit seeking damages recoverable on the total investment of \$100,000. The five co-investors beside the Plaintiffs were not joined as party plaintiffs, and the Plaintiffs have no written authority to sue for the other five investors.

38. Plaintiffs presumably would have suffered no damage in this case absent the Pakistan-India war and an extended dock strike nor would they, despite the war and dock strike, have suffered any damage if they merely held their stock as urged by Mr. Medney's father.

#### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The evidence produced at trial clearly and convincingly showed that the Plaintiffs did not establish any misrepresentations or omissions of material fact know-

ingly committed by the Defendants and relied upon by the Plaintiffs in the relevant securities transactions, and the Defendants are not guilty of violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Rule 10b-5 issued thereunder and are not liable to the Plaintiffs.

2. Regardless of the Defendants' guilt or innocence, under Rule 10b-5, the Plaintiffs would be precluded from recovery as a result of their own violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 issued thereunder in their transactions with Fiberglass Resources Corporation. The defense of *in pari delicto* is applicable to the factual situation before this Court. See *Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.*, 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969.) Plaintiffs rely heavily upon *Katz v. Amos Treat & Co.*, 411 F.2d 1046 (2nd Cir. 1969,) and claim it cannot be distinguished from the instant case. Quite to the contrary, there is nothing in the evidence in the instant case to show Defendant's conduct came within a fraction of the outrageous activities of the defendant-broker in *Katz*, such as staging "a dog and pony show" at the plant of the corporation in question to assure prospective purchasers of the thriving nature of the corporation's business. In addition, *Katz* was duped and tricked at one stage after another and understandably the Second Circuit held he was not *in pari delicto* with the Defendants. On the other hand, in the instant case Plaintiffs' letter of August 4th, 1971 was an admittedly false bluff which caused Fiberglass to purchase Plaintiffs' shares of stock.

3. For the same reason Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover because of unclean hands.



4. Plaintiffs, sophisticated investors, have not shown the necessary degree of reliance in this case to entitle them to recovery.

5. In view of these conclusions the Court does not reach a defense of lack of indispensable parties.

6. Since the Defendants are not liable to the Plaintiffs, the Third Party Complaint for indemnification is rendered moot.

7. The Counterclaimants have introduced no evidence of damages in support of their Counterclaim and Judgment is entered for the Counterdefendants.

DONE AND ORDERED at Miami, Florida, this 22d day of May, 1973.

/s/ Norman C. Roettger, Jr.

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United States District Judge

in the  
**Supreme Court**  
of the  
**United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

Case No. 75-969

S. D. COHN & COMPANY and SIDNEY D. COHN,  
*Petitioners,*

vs.

SHIRLEY WOOLF and ROBERT MILBERG, and  
FIBERGLASS RESOURCES CORPORATION,  
*Respondents.*

**BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS SHIRLEY WOOLF  
AND ROBERT MILBERG IN OPPOSITION TO  
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO  
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
IN AND FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT**

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ROBERT S. GEIGER

CAPITAL PRESS, INC. — MIAMI, FLORIDA

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in the  
**Supreme Court**  
 of the  
**United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

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**Case No. 75-969**


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S. D. COHN & COMPANY and SIDNEY D. COHN,  
*Petitioners,*

vs.

SHIRLEY WOOLF and ROBERT MILBERG, and  
 FIBERGLASS RESOURCES CORPORATION,  
*Respondents.*

---

**BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS SHIRLEY WOOLF  
 AND ROBERT MILBERG IN OPPOSITION TO  
 PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO  
 THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
 IN AND FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT**

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## A

**OPINIONS BELOW**

The instant Petition for a Writ of Certiorari aptly sets forth the opinions below. In this brief in opposition, the symbol "A" will refer to the appendix attached to the Petition for Certiorari, which Respondents adopt in full, and the symbol "R" will refer to the trial transcript of record.

## B

**GROUND UPON WHICH JURISDICTION  
OF THIS COURT IS INVOKED**

The jurisdictional requisites have been properly set forth in the Petition.

## C

**QUESTIONS PRESENTED**

WHETHER POLICY CONSIDERATIONS WHICH GOVERN SUPREME COURT REVIEW ARE PRESENT IN THE INSTANT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

A. WHETHER THE "CLEARLY ERRONEOUS" RULE PRECLUDES APPELLATE REVIEW WHERE JUDGMENT WAS PREDICATED UPON A MISAPPLICATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES.

B. WHETHER THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI PRESENTS ISSUES OF SIGNIFICANT IMPORT TO WARRANT SUPREME COURT REVIEW.

C. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED IMPROPER STANDARDS IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF *IN PARI DELICTO* AS A MATTER OF LAW.

## D

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

The Petition states an adequate chronology of the proceedings in the lower courts.

For purposes of this brief in opposition to the instant Petition, Respondents accept Petitioner's statement of the facts shown at trial, except to add that the trial testimony reflects that none of the substantial risks of the transaction at issue, known by Petitioners, were disclosed to Respondents.

Woolf and Milberg were never advised that Fiberglass Resources Corporation would be required to incur substantial start up expenses, as the plant to be purchased had been closed by the Koppers Company. (R-377, 379). No



disclosure was made to Respondents that the plant would be purchased upon receipt of the Pakistan contract and not upon its successful completion. (R-272). Respondents were never told that the summary of projections prepared by Fiberglass were not credible. (R-291). No disclosure was made that the business was extremely competitive, undercapitalized and inadequately financed. (R-313). No information was imparted to Respondents concerning the plant's operating results under either of its predecessor Companies. (R-275) These omissions in disclosure are taken directly from the trial testimony of Petitioner S. D. Cohn.

The facts clearly indicate that Respondents were led to believe they were investing in an ongoing business, assured of profitable operations and that they would realize a substantial profit on their investment. (R-42, 138).

In October, 1968, Woolf purchased 6¼% convertible subordinated debentures of Fiberglass for the sum of \$100,000. Record ownership of the debentures was \$50,000., in the name of Woolf, and \$50,000., in the name of Milberg. Respondents candidly admitted at trial that five of Respondent's friends and associates held beneficial interest in the debentures. (R-157, 158).

In March of 1969, Respondents were requested to convert their debentures, on the representation by Sidney Cohn that their conversion would improve the balance sheet, better enabling Fiberglass to obtain a bank loan from the Chemical Bank of New York. No financial information on Fiberglass was imparted to Respondents to

allow them to make an informed investment decision with respect to the conversion of debentures.

The findings of the District Court and the opinion of the Fifth Circuit are set forth in the appendix and we believe no comment with respect thereto is necessary.

### **REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT**

**THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS WHICH GOVERN SUPREME COURT REVIEW ARE NOT PRESENT IN THE INSTANT CAUSE AND ACCORDINGLY, JUDICIAL EFFICACY REQUIRES THE PETITION BE DENIED.**

Petitioners have requested the Court to issue a Writ of Certiorari to review a decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which was based upon sound and established judicial principles, does not raise important issues of federal law, and is not of major public concern. Respectfully, the Petition should be denied.

**THE "CLEARLY ERRONEOUS" RULE DOES NOT PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW WHERE JUDGMENT WAS PREDICATED UPON A MISAPPLICATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES.**

Respondents Shirley Woolf and Robert Milberg sought recovery under Rule 10b-5 adopted pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, from Petitioners S. D. Cohn & Company and Sidney D. Cohn, individually, for fraud in the sale of securities. The District Court of

the Southern District of Florida entered judgment for the Defendant/Petitioners and issued, inter alia, the following conclusions of law:

The evidence produced at trial clearly and convincingly showed that the Plaintiffs did not establish any misrepresentations or omissions of material fact knowingly committed by the Defendants and relied upon by the Plaintiffs in the relevant securities transactions, and the Defendants are not guilty of violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Rule 10b-5 issued thereunder and are not liable to the Plaintiffs. (A-66)

Plaintiffs, sophisticated investors, have not shown the necessary degree of reliance in this case to entitle them to recovery. (A-67)

Upon appeal by Respondents, the Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment of the District Court and remanded the cause for a new trial. The Court stated:

We need not decide here the validity of the trial court's findings of fact regarding specific misrepresentations or omissions, except to note the sharp conflict in the testimony regarding virtually every one of them. For, although 10b-5 liability could have been predicated upon the specific misrepresentations and omissions, if proved, it is still open to the Plaintiffs to prove a 10b-5 violation in this context based upon something broader. Assume that the Defendants

failed to qualify the sale of Fiberglass debentures as exempt from registration under §4(2) of the 1933 Act, and that part of the failure was a lack of disclosure of information regarding the investment opportunity that registration would have revealed. Depending on the amount of information the Defendants failed to disclose to offerees and its materiality to the transaction, we think there comes a point where the failure to disclose can be characterized as an "act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit" upon the offerees in violation of the third clause of the Rule. (A-38)

Petitioners have contended the Court of Appeals committed fundamental error by vacating judgment on the grounds that the "findings of fact" entered by the trial court were not determined to be "clearly erroneous". Except as to incidentally note the sharp conflicts in testimony (A-38), the Fifth Circuit did not disturb those findings of fact. Rather, The Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not apply appropriate legal standards in reaching its result. The "clearly erroneous" test set forth in Rule 52(a) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is not applicable where the trial court's conclusions are based on a misapprehension of applicable legal standards. *Crosby v. United States*, 5 Cir., 1974, 496 F.2d 1384; *Mitchell v. Raines*, 5 Cir., 1956, 238 F.2d 186; *Owen v. Commercial Union Fire Insurance Co. of New York*, 2 Cir., 1954, 211 F.2d 488. Specifically, the trial court failed to consider:

the extent to which Rule 10b-5 provides a remedy to a purchaser of securities against the issuer or others involved in the distribution when the issuer and its agents failed to conduct the distribution in such a manner that it qualifies for the exemption from registration provided by §4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77d (2) (1970). (A-33).

Indeed, the District Court made no findings of fact with respect to omissions in disclosure, in spite of the trial testimony of Petitioner, Sidney Cohn that Respondents were not advised the Koppers Company had closed the plant to be purchased and that Fiberglass would therefore incur start up costs in excess of \$100,000. (R-377, 379) No disclosure was made to Respondents that the factory would be purchased upon receipt of the Pakistan contract rather than upon its completion. (R-272) Petitioners omitted to disclose to Respondents that the financial projections in the summary should not be believed (R-291), and Respondents received no information relating to operation of the factory under the predecessor companies. (R-275)

We submit that if the Fifth Circuit intended to substitute its judgment of the facts for those of the trial court, it would have reversed with instructions to enter judgment for the Plaintiffs. Rather, the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment on the basis that the trial court had utilized an erroneous legal standard in viewing the facts before it. In its opinion denying the petition for rehearing<sup>1</sup> the court stated:

<sup>1</sup>521 F.2d 225 (5 Cir., 1975).

We wish to insure that, on remand, the District Judge will focus not so much upon specific misrepresentations that were alleged (as he did in his earlier consideration of the case), but will also be aware of the stringent disclosure requirements our Court has held necessary in the private placement context. (A-7)

The decision of the Fifth Circuit in the instant cause was dictated by the legislative and judicial history of the regulation of securities markets, and was correct. The Court applied sound and established precedent in reaching its decision and accordingly the Petition does not raise issues meriting review by this Court.

#### THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT RAISE ISSUES OF SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC IMPORT TO WARRANT SUPREME COURT REVIEW.

The instant Petition for Certiorari has presented a strained view of the holding of the Court of Appeals, in asserting it established erroneous standards for recovery in a 10b-5 case. The Court stated:

"Under any view of how far 10b-5 should extend, the area of private offerings of securities under the exemption afforded by §4(2) of the 1933 Act is so closely related to the fairness of the public private securities markets and the allocation of investment capital that it must come within the scope of the rule. The fact that the Plaintiffs sought relief under §10(b) of the 1934 Act for al-



leged violations of the 1933 Act does not alter this result, for, as the Second Circuit has noted, these acts are to be construed as "a single comprehensive scheme of regulation" to avoid inconsistencies and to promote their broad remedial purposes. *Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc.*, 2d Cir. 1969, 418 F.2d 1276 (collecting authorities.)" (A-37)

The Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment of the trial court finding that the court gave no consideration to the substantial nondisclosures of record in rendering judgment for the Petitioners. The cause was remanded to allow the trial court to determine whether the cumulative effect of the omissions in disclosure were such that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in making his investment decision. (A-52) That omissions to state material facts, in the sale of securities, may constitute a violation of Rule 10b-5 cannot be disputed. The very purpose of the Rule is to prevent injury suffered as a result of those deceptive practices. *Superintendent of Ins. vs. Bankers Life and Cas. Co.*, 2 Cir. 1970, 430 F.2d 355 reversed and remanded for trial, 404 U.S. 6, 92 S.Ct. 165, 30 L. Ed. 2d 128, *Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State of Utah vs. United States*, 1972, 406 U.S. 128, 92 S.Ct. 1456 31 L.Ed. 2d 741.

The Court additionally stated that, under certain circumstances, nondisclosure incident to failing to qualify a distribution as a private offering under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 USCA §77 (d)(2) may give rise to a violation of Rule 10b-5. If that holding sets forth a novel theory for recovery in a 10b-5 action, this cause should not be its testing ground.

Firstly, the Court painstakingly noted, throughout its opinion, the absence of clarity in the record as to what information was imparted or withheld by Petitioners to Woolf and Milberg in connection with the sale of Fiberglass debentures. (A-32) However, the Court took particular note of Sidney Cohn's own testimony that many facts of which he had knowledge were not disclosed (A-50, 51)

Considerations governing review on Certiorari, as set forth in Rule 19, Supreme Court Rules, do not contemplate that the Writ will issue where the Court cannot make a determinative ruling. We suggest that the District Court must first be permitted to consider the omissions in disclosure of record, and then determine whether these omissions constitute a 10b-5 violation. This was the instruction of the Fifth Circuit. (A-52, 53).

Secondly, Petitioners state in their brief; "clearly the placement here was a private one which cannot be seriously contested, even under the Fifth Circuit views set forth in *Hill York Corp., v. American International Franchises*, 5 Cir., 1971, 448 F.2d 680."

Whether the offering qualified as a private placement has yet to be determined, and the Court followed long established principles of securities law in stating, "on remand, the burden is on the Defendants to establish the availability of the exemption." (A-39). *S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina, Co.*, 1959, 346 U.S. 119, 73 S.Ct. 981, 97 L.Ed. 1494. (A-52).

Finally, the questions of primary importance to the financial community, with respect to the inter-relationship

between the various anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts and the private placement exemption (4(2)), relate to a determinative ruling on the factors set forth in the newly adopted Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. §240.146 (1974) of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the relationship between the 4(2) exemption and the non-exclusive Rule 146. We submit that this case does not provide the appropriate vehicle for the Court to determine this question.

No evidence whatsoever was offered at trial by the Petitioners as to the availability of the §4(2) exemption. Moreover, the offering at issue was made prior to the adoption of Rule 146. Questions relating to the qualification of offerees, the availability of information, the manner of the offering and the absence of redistribution are simply not present in the instant proceeding.

In a recent position paper, the securities law section of the American Bar Association states:

As a practical matter, there is likely to be a clear connection between the factors [above] which determine whether §5 was violated and whether disclosure was adequate. That is, the more adequate, careful and painstaking the disclosure, the more likely it is that a Court will find that the §4(2) exemption applied, including the fact that there were proper and qualified offerees who could understand the risks based upon the disclosures made to them. On the other hand, the more defective the disclosure, the more likely it is, we believe, that a Court will find the transaction to be non-exempt under §4(2). *Section*

*4(2) and Statutory Law, a Position Paper of the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association, the Business Lawyer; Vol. 31, Nov. 1975, p. 485, 502.*

The authors noted that the Securities and Exchange Commission suggested in Release No. 5226 (Jan. 10, 1972), 1CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. §2785, that the anti-fraud rules are violated in a private placement if the issuer does not make certain disclosures to the purchaser, including disclosures as to non liquidity. *Id.* at 502.

In this light, it is significant to note that the Court's opinion, with respect to disclosure requisites in the area of private offerings, will have little, if any, effect on the future regulation of securities markets. The opinion of the Court on this question was based exclusively on prior Federal decisional law expounding on the disclosure necessary for an issuer to qualify a distribution as exempt from registration. The significance of these authorities, in light of Rule 146, has clearly been diminished.

If the Court is to consider the interrelationship of these statutory provisions and administrative rules, we submit the proper case for review will involve all of the factors set forth above including Rule 146, so that the public, the financial community and the securities bar will have the benefit of a definitive decision on these issues. This cannot be accomplished in the instant cause, and therefore, as no issue of public importance has been raised, the Writ should be denied.

THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED ESTABLISHED JUDICIAL STANDARDS IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF *IN PARI DELICTO* AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The Petitioners based the defense of *in pari delicto* in the Trial Court upon two false representations which were candidly admitted by the Respondents during the course of their testimony. The first occurred at the time of purchase of the Fiberglass debentures wherein Respondents, in the debenture agreement, alleged that there were no other beneficial owners and that they were purchasing the securities for investment purposes. The second representation occurred in August 1971 at which time Respondents wrote to Medney stating that there were actually twenty-two beneficial owners of the converted debentures.

Upon these facts the Trial Court entered the following conclusion of law:

Regardless of the Defendants' guilt or innocence, under Rule 10b-5, the Plaintiffs would be precluded from recovery as a result of their own violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 10b-5 issued thereunder in their transactions with Fiberglass Resources Corporation. The defense of *in pari delicto* is applicable to the factual situation before this Court. See *Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.*, 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969.) Plaintiffs rely heavily upon *Katz v. Amos Treat & Co.*, 411 F.2d 1046 (2nd Cir. 1969), and claim it cannot be distinguished from the instant case. Quite to the contrary,

there is nothing in the evidence in the instant case to show Defendant's conduct came within a fraction of the outrageous activities of the defendant-broker in *Katz*, such as staging "a dog and pony show" at the plant of the corporation in question to assure prospective purchasers of the thriving nature of the corporation's business. In addition, *Katz* was duped and tricked at one stage after another and understandably the Second Circuit held he was not *in pari delicto* with the Defendants. On the other hand, in the instant case Plaintiff's letter of August 4, 1971, was an admittedly false bluff which caused Fiberglass to purchase Plaintiff's shares of stock. (A-67)

The Fifth Circuit rejected the finding of the Trial Court and held that the defense of *in pari delicto* did not apply to bar Respondent's from recovery, as a matter of law.

The Fifth Circuit's holding with respect to the defense was grounded upon well established judicial principles set forth in the appellate decisions cited below.

The Court specifically found that Respondent's letter to Medney of August, 1971, was wholly unrelated in time and in purpose from the alleged unlawful activity of the Petitioners, and could not be characterized as active, knowing, simultaneous or of equal participation in the primary activity which constituted the subject matter of Respondent's complaint. (A-30). *Keystone Driller Co., vs. General Excavator Co.*, 1933, 290 U.S. 240, 54 S.Ct. 146, 78 L.Ed. 293; *Kiefer-Stewart Co., vs. Seagram and*



*Sons*, 1951, 340 U.S. 211, 71 S.Ct. 259, 95 L.Ed. 219; *Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. vs. International Parts Co.*, 1968, 392 U.S. 134, 88 S.Ct. 1981, 20 L.Ed.2d 982. Moreover, Petitioners were not in any way affected by the admitted misrepresentation, and were not parties to the subsequent repurchase of the Fiberglass stock.

The Court further found, based on the decision of the Second Circuit in *Katz v. Amos Treat*, 1969, 411 F.2d 1046 and of the Tenth Circuit, in *Can-Am Petroleum Co., vs. Beck*, 1964 331 F.2d 371, that the representations made by Respondents in the debenture agreement could not constitute a bar to recovery as a matter of law. Those decisions presented direct precedent, in factually similar settings, and were relied upon heavily by the Fifth Circuit on the instant issue.

Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals employed improper standards for the applicability of the defense of *in pari delicto* but present no decisions in conflict with those cited by the Court.

Whether the defense is applicable to the facts of this action is of no public consequence, nor does it meet any other jurisdictional consideration for review by this Court. After an exhaustive study of the facts, in light of the controlling authorities, the Fifth Circuit found the defense did not apply. As their decision was based upon established authority, the issue is simply not one warranting Supreme Court review.

## CONCLUSION

Respectfully, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied. Petitioners have presented issues before this Court which are singularly narrow, factually ambiguous, and of minor importance to the public in general, and the securities bar in particular. If the Court passed upon a novel question of securities law concerning the disclosure requirements upon an issuer in a private placement offering, it did so without reliance on the newly adopted Rule 146, and in an action for violation of Rule 10b-5. For these reasons we suggest this case does not present a proper setting for Supreme Court review of this issue. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit properly vacated the judgment of the trial court on other grounds. Firstly, the trial court applied erroneous legal standards in concluding that Plaintiffs had failed to prove a 10b-5 violation. Secondly, the trial court improperly found the defense of *in pari delicto* barred Plaintiffs from recovery.

Respectfully submitted,

LEVINE, RECKSON & REED, P.A.  
*Attorneys for Petitioners*

By /s/ Richard E. Reckson

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that three true copies of the Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari has been mailed this \_\_\_\_ day of February, 1976, to: Robert Orseck, Esquire, Attorney for Petitioners, 25 West Flagler Street, Suite 1201, Miami, Florida 33130, and to Terrence Russell, Esquire, 900 N.E. 26th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, Attorneys for Fiberglass Resources Corp., in accordance with Rule 33 of this Court.

By /s/ Richard E. Reckson

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